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Abstract
We develop a framework in which individuals’ preferences coevolve with their abilities to deceive others
about their preferences and intentions. Specifically, individuals are characterized by (i) a level of cognitive
sophistication and (ii) a subjective utility function. Increased cognition is costly, but higher-level individuals
have the advantage of being able to completely deceive lower-level opponents about their preferences and
intentions. Only individuals who are of the same cognitive level can observe each other’s preferences. Our
main result shows that, despite the limited possibility to observe preferences, and despite the strong form of
deception, essentially only efficient population states can be stable. Moreover, if the marginal cognitive costs
are not too high, then only efficient Nash equilibria are stable. We extend our model to study preferences
that depend also on the opponent’s type.
Keywords: Evolution of Preferences; Indirect Evolutionary Approach, Theory of Mind; Depth of Rea-
soning; Deception; Efficiency. JEL codes: C72, C73, D03, D83.
1 Introduction
For a long time economists took preferences as given. The study of their origin and formation was considered
a question outside the scope of economics. Over the past two decades this has changed dramatically. In
particular, there is now a large literature on the evolutionary foundations of preferences (for an overview, see
Robson and Samuelson, 2011). A prominent strand of this literature is the so-called “indirect evolutionary
approach”, pioneered by Güth and Yaari (1992) (term coined by Güth, 1995). This approach has been used
to explain the existence of a variety of “non-standard” preferences that do not coincide with material payoffs,
e.g., altruism, spite, and reciprocal preferences.1 Typically, the non-materialistic preferences in question convey
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1For example, Bester and Güth (1998), Bolle (2000), and Possajennikov (2000) study combinations of altruism, spite, and
selfishness. Ellingsen (1997) finds that preferences that induce aggressive bargaining can survive in a Nash demand game. Fershtman
and Weiss (1998) study evolution of concerns for social status. Sethi and Somanthan (2001) study the evolution of reciprocity in
the form of preferences that are conditional on the opponent’s preference type. In the context of the finitely repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma, Guttman (2003) explores the stability of conditional cooperation. Dufwenberg and Güth (1999) study firm’s preferences
for large sales. Güth and Napel (2006) study preference evolution when players use the same preferences in both ultimatum and
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some form of commitment advantage that induces opponents to behave in a way that benefits individuals with
non-materialistic preferences, as described by Schelling (1960) and Frank (1987). Indeed, Heifetz, Shannon, and
Spiegel (2007) show that this kind of result is generic.
A crucial feature of the indirect evolutionary approach is that preferences are explicitly or implicitly assumed
to be at least partially observable.2 Consequently the results are vulnerable to the existence of mimics who
signal that they have, say, a preference for cooperation, but actually defect on cooperators, thereby earning the
benefits of having the non-standard preference without having to pay the cost (Samuelson, 2001). The effect of
varying the degree to which preferences can be observed has been investigated by Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001),
Ely and Yilankaya (2001), Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007), and Herold and Kuzmics (2009). They confirm
that the degree to which preferences are observed decisively influences the outcome of preference evolution.
However, the degree to which preferences are observed is still exogenous in these models. In reality we would
expect both the preferences, and the ability to observe or conceal them, to be the product of an evolutionary
process.3 This paper studies the missing link between evolution of preferences and evolution of how preferences
are concealed, feigned, and detected. In our model the ability to observe preferences and the ability to deceive
and induce false beliefs about preferences are endogenously determined by evolution, jointly with the evolution
of preferences. Cognitively more sophisticated players completely deceive cognitively less sophisticated players.
Mutual observation of preferences occurs only when players of the same cognitive level meet. Despite allowing for
only a “grain” of mutual observability, and despite assuming a strong form of deception, we find that, generically,
only efficient outcomes can be played in stable population states. Moreover, if the marginal cognitive cost is
not too high, then only Nash outcomes can be played in stable population states. Conversely, we find that,
generically any efficient Nash equilibrium can be implemented in a stable population state. Thus, essentially,
an outcome is stable if and only if it is an efficient Nash equilibrium.
Overview of the Model. As in standard evolutionary game theory we assume an infinite population of
individuals who are uniformly randomly matched to play a symmetric normal form game.4 Each individual
has a type, which is a tuple, consisting of a preference component and a cognitive component. The preference
component is identified with a utility function over the set of outcomes (i.e., action profiles). In an extension we
allow for type-interdependent preferences, which are represented by utility functions that are defined over both
action profiles and the opponent’s type. The cognitive component is simply a natural number, representing the
dictator games. Koçkcesen and Ok (2000) investigate survival of more general interdependent preferences in aggregative games.
Friedman and Singh (2009) show that vengefulness may survive if observation has some degree of informativeness. Recently,
Norman (2012) show how to adapt some of these results into a dynamic model
2Gamba (2013) is an interesting exception. She assumes play of a self-confirming equilibrium, rather than a Nash equilibrium,
in an extensive form game. This allows for evolution of non-materialistic preferences even when they are completely unobservable.
An alternative is to allow for a dynamic that is not strictly payoff monotonic. This approach is pursued by Frenkel, Heller, and
Teper (2014), who show that multiple biases (inducing non-materialistic preferences) can survive in non-monotonic evolutionary
dynamics even if they are unobservable, because each approximately compensates for the errors of the others.
3On this topic, Robson and Samuelson (2011) write: “The standard argument is that we can observe preferences because people
give signals – a tightening of the lips or flash of the eyes – that provide clues as to their feelings. However, the emission of such
signals and their correlation with the attendant emotions are themselves the product of evolution. [...] We cannot simply assume
that mimicry is impossible, as we have ample evidence of mimicry from the animal world, as well as experience with humans who
make their way by misleading others as to their feelings, intentions and preferences. [...] In our view, the indirect evolutionary
approach will remain incomplete until the evolution of preferences, the evolution of signals about preferences, and the evolution of
reactions to these signals, are all analysed within the model.” [Emphasis added] (pp. 14–15)
4It is known that positive assortative matching is conducive to the evolution of altruistic behaviour (Hines and Maynard Smith,
1979) and non-materialistic preferences even when preferences are perfectly unobservable (Alger and Weibull, 2013, Bergstrom
1995). It is also known that finite populations allow for the evolution of spiteful behaviours (Schaffer, 1988) and non-materialistic
preferences (Huck and Oechssler, 1999). By assuming that individuals are uniformly randomly matched in an infinite population,
we avoid confounding these effects with the effect of endogenising the degree of observability.
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level of cognitive sophistication of the individual.5 The cost of increased cognition is strictly positive.
When the individuals in a match are of different cognitive levels, the one with the higher level is assumed
to be able to deceive the one with the lower level. For the sake of tractability, and in order to “stack the cards”
against our main result, we model a strong form of deception. The deceiver observes the opponent’s preferences
perfectly, and is allowed to choose whatever she wants the deceived party to believe about the deceiver’s intended
action choice. A strategy profile that is consistent with this form of deception is called a deception equilibrium.
When both individuals are of the same cognitive level, we assume that each player observes the opponent’s
preferences, and, as a result, the individuals play a Nash equilibrium of the complete information game induced
by their preferences.6
The state of a population is described by a configuration, consisting of a type distribution and a behaviour
policy. The type distribution is simply a finite support distribution on the set of types. The behaviour policy
specifies a Nash equilibrium for each match between cognitive equals, and a deception equilibrium for each
match between types of different cognitive levels. In a neutrally stable configuration all incumbents earn the
same, and if a small group of mutants enter they earn weakly less than the incumbents in any focal post-entry
state. A focal post-entry state is one in which the incumbents behave against each other in the same way as
before the mutants entered.
Main Results. We say that a profile is efficient if it maximizes the sum of fitness payoffs. Theorem 1
demonstrates that in any stable configuration, any type θ¯ with the highest cognitive level in the incumbent
population must play efficiently when meeting itself. The intuition is that otherwise a highest-type mutant who
mimics the play of θ¯ against all incumbents while playing efficiently against itself, would outperform type θ¯ (an
application of the “secret handshake” argument due to Robson, 1990).
Next we restrict attention to generic games (i.e., games in which each fitness payoff is independently drawn
from a continuous distribution) and obtain our main result: any stable configuration must induce efficient play
in all matches between all types. The idea of the proof can be briefly sketched as follows. We first show that any
type θ in a stable configuration must play efficiently when meeting itself. Otherwise a mutant who has the same
level as θ and the same utility function as θ, but who plays efficiently against itself, could invade the population.
Next, we show that any two types must play efficiently. The intuition is that otherwise the mean within-group
fitness would be higher than the between-group fitness, which implies that there would be instability to small
perturbations in the frequency of the types: A type who became slightly more frequent would have a higher
fitness than the other incumbents, and this would take the population away from the original configuration.
The existing literature (e.g., Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007) has demonstrated that if players perfectly
observe the opponent’s preferences (or do so with sufficiently high probability), then only efficient outcomes are
stable. Our key contribution is to show that a “grain” of perfect observability is enough to ensure that stability
implies efficiency. Unlike the existing models, which assume that any player perfectly observes the preferences
of any other player, our model assumes perfect observability only as a “tie-breaking” rule: players with equal
levels perfectly observe each other’s preferences, but a player who acquires a higher cognitive level (which may
incur an arbitrarily low cognitive cost) is able to completely deceive her opponent about her preferences.
Next we make a few observations, which allow us to fully characterize stable configurations in generic games.
5The one-dimensional representation of cognitive ability reflects the idea that if one is good at deceiving others, then one is more
likely to be good also at reading others and avoiding being deceived by them. In this paper we simplify this relation by assuming
a perfect correlation between the two abilities, and leave the study of more general relations for future research.
6Our assumption that players of equal levels play a Nash equilibrium can be motivated by the (so-called) “folk theorem of
evolutionary game theory”, which implies that, for many evolutionary dynamics, any stable population state is a Nash equilibrium
of the underlying complete information game (see Nachbar, 1990, for a formal statement and proof).
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We note that any generic game admits at most one efficient symmetric action profile, and that this symmetric
action profile is either a strict equilibrium or not an equilibrium at all. In the former case, we demonstrate
the stability of a homogeneous population of individuals with the lowest cognitive level and with preferences
such that the efficient action is dominant. Moreover, if the cognitive cost required for achieving the second
cognitive level is sufficiently low, then this stable configuration is essentially unique. In any other case, i.e.,
where the underlying game does not have an efficient symmetric action profile, or if an efficient symmetric
action profile exists but is not an equilibrium, then there is no stable configuration. We also show that the same
characterization holds for pure stable configurations in non-generic games.
Finally, we note that non-generic games may admit different kinds of stable configurations. One particularly
interesting family of non-generic games is the family of zero-sum games, such as the Rock-Paper-Scissors game.
We analyse this game and characterize a heterogeneous stable population (inspired by a related construction in
Conlisk, 2001) in which different cognitive levels coexist, players with equal levels play the Nash equilibrium,
and players with higher levels beat their opponents but this gain is offset by higher cognitive costs.
Variants and Extensions. As mentioned above, our main result relies on having perfect observability as
the “tie-breaking” rule in matches between cognitive equals. In Section 5 we consider the opposite assumption,
namely, that players with equal levels do not observe each other’s preferences. This means that there are no
matches in which there is mutual observation of preferences. We show that this variant yields very different
results. Specifically, we show that (1) any pure strict (possibly inefficient) equilibrium of the underlying game is
stable, and, as a partial converse, (2) the individuals of the highest type always play a Nash equilibrium (again,
not necessarily efficient) when being matched against themselves. Thus, whether stability implies efficiency or
Nash equilibrium behaviour, crucially depends on the assumption of a “grain” of exogenous observability in
the matches between equals in our model. The existing literature (e.g., Ok and Vega-Redondo, 2001; Ely and
Yilankaya, 2001; Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007; Norman, 2012) shows that if players cannot observe each
other’s preferences, then only Nash equilibria can be stable. Our results show that non-observability among
players with equal levels is enough to imply that a strict Nash equilibrium is sufficient for stability, even though
our setup allows a player to spend a (possibly arbitrarily low) additional cognitive cost, in order to obtain a
higher level than her opponent, and perfectly observe her opponent’s preferences.
In most of the paper we deal only with “type-neutral” preferences that are defined only over action profiles.
Section 6 extends the analysis to interdependent preferences, i.e., preferences that may also depend on the
opponent’s type. Herold and Kuzmics (2009) study a similar setup while assuming perfect observability of
types among all individuals. Their key result is that any mixed action that gives each player a payoff above her
maxmin payoff can be the outcome of a stable configuration.7 We obtain a slightly weaker extension of this result
while assuming only perfect observability among individuals with equal cognitive levels. Specifically, we show
that stable pure population states (i.e., populations in which everyone plays the same pure action) are essentially
Nash equilibria that yield each player a payoff above the maxmin value. We conclude by characterizing stable
configurations in the “Hawk-Dove” game (Section 6.4). We show that such games admit heterogeneous stable
configurations in which players with different levels coexist, each type has discriminating preferences that induce
7Herold and Kuzmics (2009) expand the framework of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) to include interdependent preferences,
i.e., preferences that depend on the opponent’s preference type. Under perfect or almost perfect observability, if all preferences that
depend on the opponent’s type are considered, then any symmetric outcome above the minmax material payoff is evolutionarily
stable. In our setting a pure profile also has to be a Nash equilibrium in order to be the sole outcome supported by evolutionarily
stable preferences. Herold and Kuzmics (2009) find that non-discriminating preferences (including selfish materialistic preferences)
are typically not evolutionarily stable on their own. By contrast, certain preferences that exhibit discrimination are evolutionarily
stable. Similarly, evolutionary stability requires the presence of discriminating preferences also in our setup.
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cooperation only against itself, and higher types “exploit” lower types (and this is offset by their higher cognitive
levels).
In Appendix B we briefly present another variant of the model in which the deceiver is not able to “tailor”
the attempted deception to the current opponent’s type. Instead, an individual has to use the same attempted
deception against all opponents. It turns out that qualitatively similar results hold with this less flexible form
of deception.
Further related literature. There is a large literature in biology and evolutionary psychology on the evolu-
tion of “theory of mind” (Premack andWoodruff 1979). According to the “Machiavellian intelligence” hypothesis
(Humphrey, 1976), and “social brain” hypothesis (Dunbar, 1998), the extraordinary cognitive abilities of humans
evolved as a result of the demands of social interactions, rather than the demands of the natural environment:
in a single-person decision problem there is a fixed benefit of being smart, but in a strategic situation it may
be important to be smarter than the opponent. From an evolutionary perspective, the potential advantage
of a better theory of mind has to be traded off against the cost of increased reasoning capacity. Increased
cognitive sophistication in the form of higher-order beliefs is associated with non-negligible costs (Holloway,
1996, Kinderman, Dunbar, and Bentall 1998). Our model incorporates these features.
There is a smaller literature on the evolution of strategic sophistication within game theory; see, e.g.,Stahl
(1993), Banerjee and Weibull (1995), Stennek (2000), Conlisk (2001), Abreu and Sethi (2003), Mohlin (2012),
Rtischev (2012), and Heller (2015). As in these papers, we provide results to the effect that different degrees of
cognitive sophistication may coexist.
Kimborough, Robalino, and Robson (2014) construct a model to demonstrate the advantage of having
a theory of mind (understood as an ability to ascribe stable preferences to other players) over learning by
reinforcement. In novel games the ascribed preferences allow the agents with a theory of mind to draw on
past experience whereas a reinforcement learner without such a model has to start over again. Hopkins (2014)
explains why costly signaling of altruism may be especially valuable for those agents who have a theory of mind.
Robson (1990) initiated a literature on evolution in cheap talk games by formulating the secret handshake
effect: evolution selects an efficient stable state if mutants can send messages that the incumbents either do
not see or not benefit from seeing. Against the incumbents a mutant plays the same action as the incumbents
do, but against other mutants the mutant plays an action that is a component of the efficient equilibrium.
Thus the mutants are able to invade unless the incumbents are already playing efficiently. See also Matsui
(1991). As pointed out by Wärneryd (1991), and Schlag (1993), among others, problems arise if either the
incumbents use all available messages (so that there is no message left for the incumbents to coordinate on) or
the incumbents follow a strategy that induces the mutants to play an action that lowers the mutants’ payoffs
below those of the incumbents. Kim and Sobel (1995) use stochastic stability arguments, and Wärneryd (1998)
uses complexity costs, to circumvent this problem. Similarly, evolution selects efficient outcome in our model,
where the preferences also serve the function of messages
Structure. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3 we define
our stability notions. The results for the main model are presented in Section 4. Section 5 deals with a variant
in which a player cannot observe the preferences of an opponent with the same cognitive level. Section 6 extends
the model to include type-interdependent preferences. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A contains proofs not
in the main text. Appendix B presents a variant of the model with uniform deception. Appendix C formally
constructs heterogeneous stable populations in Rock-Paper-Scissors and Hawk-Dove games.
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2 Model
We consider a large population of agents, each of which is endowed with a type that determines her subjective
preferences and her cognitive level. The agents are randomly matched to play a symmetric two-player game.
A dynamic evolutionary process of cultural learning, or biological inheritance, increases the frequency of more
successful types. In the next section, we present a static solution concept to capture stable population states
in such environments.
2.1 Underlying Game and Types
Consider a symmetric two-player normal form game G with a finite set A of pure actions and a set ∆ (A) of
mixed actions (or strategies). We use the letter a (σ) to describe a typical pure action (mixed action). Payoffs
are given by pi : A × A → R, where pi (a, a′) is the payoff to a player using action a against action a′. The
payoff function is extended to mixed actions in the standard way, where pi (σ, σ′) denotes the material payoff to
a player using strategy σ, against an opponent using strategy σ′. With a slight abuse of notation let a denote
the degenerate mixed strategy that puts all weight on pure strategy a. We adopt this convention for probability
distributions throughout the paper.
Remark 1. The restriction to symmetric games is without loss of generality when dealing with interactions
in a single population. In cases in which the interaction is asymmetric, it can be captured in our setup (as is
standard in the literature; see, e.g.,Selten, 1980 and Samuelson, 1991) by embedding the asymmetric interaction
in a larger, symmetric game in which nature first randomly assigns the players to roles in the asymmetric
interaction.
We imagine a large (technically infinite) population of individuals who are uniformly randomly matched to
play the game G. Each individual i in the population is endowed with a type θ = (u, n) ∈ Θ = U ×N, consisting
of preferences, identified with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, u ∈ U and a cognitive level n ∈ N.
Let ∆ (Θ) be the set of all finite support probability distributions on Θ. A population is represented by a finite
support type distribution µ ∈ ∆ (Θ). Let C (µ) denote the support (carrier) of type distribution µ ∈ ∆ (Θ).
Elements of C (µ) will be called incumbents. Given a type θ, we use uθ and nθ to refer to its preferences and
cognitive level, respectively.
In the main model we assume that the preferences are defined over action profiles, as in Dekel, Ely, and
Yilankaya (2007).8 This means that any preferences can be represented by a utility function of the form u :
A×A→ R. The set of all possible (modulo affine transformations) utility functions on A×A is U = [0, 1]|A|2 . Let
BRu (σ′) denote the set of best replies to strategy σ′ given preferences u, i.e., BRu (σ′) = arg maxσ∈∆(A) u (σ, σ′).
There is a fitness cost to increased cognition, represented by a strictly increasing cognitive cost function
k : N→ R+. The fitness payoff of an individual equals the material payoff from the game, minus the cognitive
cost. Let kn denote the cost of having cognitive level n. Hence kθ = knθ denotes the cost of having type θ.
Without loss of generality, we assume that k1 = 0. In some of our results we will make the additional assumption
that k2 is sufficiently small.
2.2 Configurations
A state of the population is described by a type distribution and a behaviour policy for each type in the
support of the type distribution. An individual’s behaviour is assumed to be (subjectively) rational in the sense
8In Section 6, we study type-interdependent preferences, which depend also on the opponent’s type, as in Herold and Kuzmics
(2009).
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that it maximizes her subjective preferences given the belief she has about the opponent’s expected behaviour.
However, her beliefs may be incorrect, if she is deceived by her opponent. An individual is deceived if and only
if her opponent is of a higher cognitive level.
If two individuals of the same cognitive level are matched to play, then they play a Nash equilibrium of the
game induced by their preferences. Given two preferences u, u′ ∈ U , let NE (u, u′) ⊆ ∆ (A)×∆ (A) be the set
of mixed equilibria of the game induced by the preferences u and u′, i.e.,
NE (u, u′) = {(σ, σ′) ∈ ∆ (A)×∆ (A) : σ ∈ BRu (σ′) and σ′ ∈ BRu′ (σ)} .
Remark 2. Similar to most on the existing literature of the indirect evolutionary approach (e.g., Güth and
Yaari, 1992; Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007, Section 3), we assume perfect observability of the opponent’s
preferences. However, while the existing literature assumes this for all interactions, we assume it only when two
incumbents with the same cognitive level interact. When two agents with different levels meet, the observability
is endogenously determined by the deception efforts of the player with the higher level, and the observability
assumption is only used as a “tie-breaking rule”. In Section 5 we analyse the opposite “tie-breaking rule”,
according to which, when agents with the same cognitive level interact, they do not observe the opponent’s
preferences.
If two individuals of different cognitive levels are matched to play, then the individual with the higher
cognitive level (henceforth, the higher type) observes the opponent’s preferences perfectly, and is able to deceive
the opponent (henceforth, the lower type). The deceiver is allowed to choose whatever she wants the deceived
party to believe about the deceiver’s intended action choice. The deceived party best-responds given her possibly
incorrect belief.
For simplicity, we assume that if the deceived party has multiple best replies, then the deceiver is allowed
to break indifference, and choose which of the best replies she wants the deceived party to play. Consequently
the deceiver is able to induce the deceived party to play any strategy that is a best reply to some belief about
the opponent’s mixed action, given the deceived party’s preferences.
Given preferences u ∈ U , let Σ (u) denote the set of undominated strategies. By the minmax theorem, Σ (u)
is also the set of actions that are best replies to at least one strategy of the opponent (given the preferences u).
Formally, we define
Σ (u) = {σ ∈ ∆ (A) : there exists σ′ ∈ ∆ (A) such that σ ∈ BRu (σ′)} .
We say that a strategy profile is a deception equilibrium if the strategy profile is optimal from the point of view
of player i under the constraint that player j has to play an undominated strategy. Formally:
Definition 1. Given two types θ, θ′ with nθ > nθ′ , a strategy profile (σ˜, σ˜′) is a deception equilibrium if
(σ˜, σ˜′) ∈ arg max
σ∈∆(A),σ′∈Σ(uθ′ )
uθ (σ, σ′) .
Let DE (θ, θ′) be the set of all such deception equilibria.
We are now in a position to define our key notion of a configuration, by combining a type distribution with
a behaviour policy, as represented by Nash equilibria and deception equilibria.
Definition 2. A configuration is a pair (µ, b) where µ ∈ ∆ (U) is a type distribution, and b : C (µ)×C (µ) −→
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∆ (A) is a behaviour policy such that for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ) :
nθ = nθ′ =⇒ (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) ∈ NE (θ, θ′) , and
nθ > nθ′ =⇒ (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) ∈ DE (θ, θ′) .
We interpret bθ (θ′) = b (θ, θ′) as the strategy of type θ when being matched with type θ′.
Given a configuration (µ, b) we call the types in its support the incumbents.
Note that standard arguments imply that for any type distribution µ there exists a mapping b : C (µ) ×
C (µ) −→ ∆ (A) such that (µ, b) is a configuration.
The expected fitness to an individual of type θ in configuration (µ, b) is:
Πθ ((µ, b)) =
∑
θ′∈C(µ)
µ (θ′) · pi (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ))− kθ.
When all incumbent types have the same expected fitness, we say that the configuration is balanced, and denote
this uniform expected payoff by Π ((µ, b)) .
Remark 3. Our model assumes that a player may use different deceptions against different types with lower
cognitive levels. We note that all our results remain the same (with minor changes to the proofs) in an alternative
setup in which individuals have to use the same mixed action in their deception efforts towards all opponents
with lower cognitive levels. We refer to this as uniform deception. The formal changes in the model that are
required to implement this variant are described in Appendix A.
3 Evolutionary Stability
Recall that a neutrally stable strategy (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973 and Maynard Smith, 1982) is a strategy
that, if played by most of the population, weakly outperforms any other strategy. Similarly, an evolutionarily
stable strategy is a strategy that, if played by most of the population, strictly outperforms any other strategy.
Definition 3. A strategy σ ∈ ∆ (A) is a neutrally stable strategy (NSS) if for every σ′ ∈ ∆ (A) there is some
ε¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that if ε ∈ (0, ε¯), then p˜i (σ′, (1− ε)σ + εσ′) ≤ p˜i (σ, (1− ε)σ + εσ′). If the weak inequality is
replaced by strict inequality for each σ′ 6= σ, then σ is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).
We extend the notions of neutral and evolutionary stability, from strategies to configurations. We begin by
defining the type game that is induced by a configuration.
Definition 4. For any configuration (µ, b) the corresponding type game Γ(µ,b) is the symmetric two-player game
where each player’s strategy space is C (µ), and the payoff to strategy θ, against θ′, is pi (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ))− kθ.
The definition of a type game allows us to apply notions and results from standard evolutionary game
theory, where evolution acts upon strategies, to the present setting where evolution acts upon types. A similar
methodology was used in Mohlin (2012). Note that each type distribution with support in C (µ) is represented
by a mixed strategy in Γ(µ,b).
We want to capture robustness with respect to small groups of individuals, henceforth called mutants, which
introduce new types and new behaviours into the population. Suppose that a fraction ε of the population is
replaced by mutants and suppose that the distribution of types within the group of mutants is µ′ ∈ ∆ (Θ).
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Consequently the post-entry type distribution is µ˜ = (1− ε) ·µ+ε ·µ′. That is, for each type θ ∈ C (µ)∪C (µ′),
µ˜ (θ) = (1− ε) · µ (θ) + ε · µ′ (θ). In line with most of the literature on the indirect evolutionary approach we
assume that adjustment of behaviour is infinitely faster than the adjustment of the type distribution.9 Thus
we assume that the post-entry type distribution quickly stabilizes into a configuration
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. There may exist
many such post-entry type configurations, all with the same type distribution, but with different behaviour
policies. We note that incumbents do not have to adjust their behaviour against other incumbents in order
to continue playing Nash equilibria, and deception equilibria, among themselves. For this reason, we assume
(similar to Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007) that the incumbents maintain the same pre-entry behaviour among
themselves. Formally:
Definition 5. Let (µ, b) and
(
µ˜, b˜
)
be two configurations such that C (µ) ⊆ C (µ˜). We say that (µ˜, b˜) is focal
(with respect to (µ, b)) if θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ) implies that b˜θ (θ′) = bθ (θ′) .
Standard fixed point arguments imply that for every configuration (µ, b) and every type distribution µ˜
satisfying C (µ) ⊆ C (µ˜) , there exists a behaviour policy b˜ such that (µ˜, b˜) is a focal configuration.
Our stability notion requires that the incumbents outperform all mutants in all configurations that are focal
relative to the initial configuration.
Definition 6. A configuration (µ, b) is a neutrally stable configuration (NSC), if for every µ′ ∈ ∆ (Θ), there
is some ε¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all ε ∈ (0, ε¯), it holds that if (µ˜, b˜), where µ˜ = (1− ε) · µ + ε · µ′, is a focal
configuration, then µ is an NSS in the type game Γ(µ˜,b˜). The configuration (µ, b) is an evolutionarily stable
configuration (ESC) if the same conditions imply that µ is an ESS in the type game Γ(µ˜,b˜) for each µ
′ 6= µ.
We conclude this section by discussing four issues related to our notion of stability.
1. The main stability notion that we use in the paper is NSC. The stronger notion of ESC is not useful in
our main model because there always exist equivalent types that have slightly different preferences (as
the set of preferences is a continuum) and induce the same behaviour as the incumbents. Such mutants
would always achieve the same fitness as the incumbents in post-entry configurations, and thus ESCs will
never exist. Note that the stability notions in Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) and Alger and Weibull
(2013) are also based on neutral stability.10 In Section 6 we study a variant of the model in which the
preferences may depend also on the opponent’s types. This will allow for the existence of ESCs.
2. Observe that Def. 6 implies internal stability with respect to small perturbations in the frequencies of
the incumbent types (because when µ′ = µ, then µ is required to be an NSS in Γ(µ,b)). By standard
arguments, internal stability implies that any NSC is “balanced”: all incumbent types obtain the same
fitness.
3. By simple adaptations of existing results in the literature, one can show that NSCs and ESCs are dy-
namically stable. NSCs are Lyapunov stable: no small change in the population composition can lead
it away from µ in the type game Γ(µ˜,b˜), if types evolve according to the replicator dynamic (Thomas,
1985, Bomze and Weibull, 1995). ESCs are also asymptotically stable: populations starting close enough
to µ eventually converge to µ in Γ(µ˜,b˜) if types evolve according to a smooth payoff-monotonic selection
dynamic (Taylor and Jonker, 1978, Cressman, 1997, Sandholm, 2010).
9Sandholm (2001) and Mohlin (2010) are exceptions.
10In their stability analysis of homo hamiltonensis preferences Alger and Weibull (2013) disregard mutants who are behaviourally
indistinguishable from homo hamiltonensis upon entry.
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4. The stability notions of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) and Alger and Weibull (2013) only consider
monomorphic groups of mutants (i.e., all mutants having the same type). We also consider stability against
polymorphic groups of mutants (as do Herold and Kuzmics, 2009). One advantage of our approach is that
it allows us to use an adaptation of the well-known notion of ESS, which immediately implies dynamic
stability and internal stability, whereas Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) have to introduce a novel notion
of stability without these properties. We note that our results remain similar with an analogous notion of
stability that deals only with monomorphic mutants, except that in this case stability of pure outcomes
would imply only a weaker notion of efficiency that compares the fitness only to symmetric profiles, as
discussed in Remark 4.2 below.
4 Results
4.1 Preliminaries
We say that a strategy profile is efficient if it maximizes the sum of fitness payoffs. Formally:
Definition 7. A strategy profile (σ, σ′) is efficient in the game G = (A, pi) if pi (σ, σ′) + pi (σ′, σ) ≥ pi (a, a′) +
pi (a′, a), for each action profile (a, a′).
Let p¯i = maxa,a′∈A (0.5 · (pi (a, a′) + pi (a, a′))) denote the efficient payoff, i.e., the average payoff achieved by
players who play an efficient profile. A pure Nash equilibrium (a, a) is strict if pi (a, a) > pi (a′, a) for all a′ ∈ A.
Given a configuration (µ, b) let n¯ = maxθ∈C(µ) nθ denote the maximal cognitive level of the incumbents. We
refer to incumbents with this cognitive level as the highest types.
A deception equilibrium is fitness maximizing if it maximizes the fitness of the type with the higher level
of the types in the match (under the restriction that the type with the lower level plays an action that is not
dominated, given her preferences). Formally:
Definition 8. Let θ, θ′ be two types with nθ > nθ′ . A deception equilibrium (σ˜, σ˜′) ∈ DE (θ, θ′) is fitness
maximizing if:
(σ˜, σ˜′) ∈ arg max
σ∈∆(A), σ′∈Σ(uθ′ )
pi (σ, σ′) .
Let FMDE (θ, θ′) ⊆ DE (θ, θ′) denote the set of all such fitness-maximising deception equilibria of two
types θ, θ′ with nθ > nθ′ . Note that FMDE (θ, θ′) might be an empty set (if there is no action profile that
maximizes both the fitness and the subjective utility of the higher type).
A configuration is pure if everyone plays the same action. Formally:
Definition 9. A configuration (µ, b) is pure if there exists a∗ ∈ A such that bθ (θ′) = a∗ for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ) .
With a slight abuse of notation we denote such a pure configuration by (µ, a∗), and we refer to a∗ as the
outcome of the configuration.
In order to simplify the notation and the arguments in the proofs, we assume throughout this section that
the underlying game admits at least three actions (i.e., |A| ≥ 3). The results could be extended to games with
two actions, but it would make the notation more cumbersome and the proofs less instructive.
4.2 Characterization of the Highest Types’ Behaviour
In this section we characterize the behaviour of an incumbent type, θ¯ = (u, n¯), which has the highest level of
cognition in the population. We show that the behaviour satisfies the following three conditions:
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1. Type θ¯ plays an efficient action profile when meeting itself.
2. Type θ¯ maximizes its fitness in all interactions with types with lower cognitive levels.
3. Any opponent with a lower cognitive level achieves at most p¯i when being matched with θ¯.
Theorem 1. Let (µ∗, b∗)be an NSC, and θ, θ¯ ∈ C (µ∗).
1. If nθ¯ = n¯ then pi
(
bθ¯
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯
(
θ¯
))
= p¯i.
2. If nθ < nθ¯ = n¯ then
((
bθ¯ (θ) , bθ
(
θ¯
))) ∈ FMDE (θ¯, θ) .
3. If nθ < nθ¯ = n¯ then pi
(
bθ
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯ (θ)
) ≤ p¯i.
Proof Sketch (formal proof in Appendix A.2). The proof utilizes mutants (denoted by θ1, θ2, and θˆ, below) with
the highest cognitive level n¯ and with a specific kind of utility functions, called indifferent and pro-generous,
which make a player indifferent between all her own actions, but which make the player prefer the opponent to
choose an action that allows the player to obtain the highest possible fitness payoff.
To prove part 1 of the theorem, assume to the contrary that pi
(
bθ¯
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯
(
θ¯
))
< p¯i. Let a1, a2 ∈ A be any
two actions such that (a1, a2) is an efficient action profile (i.e., 0.5 · (pi (a1, a2) + pi (a1, a2)) = p¯i). Consider two
mutant types θ1 and θ2, (θ1 6= θ2) which are of the highest cognitive level that is present in the population,
and have indifferent and pro-generous utility functions. Suppose equal fractions of these two mutant types
enter the population. There is a focal post-entry configuration, in which; the incumbents keep playing their
pre-entry play among themselves, the mutants play fitness-maximising deception equilibria against lower types,
the mutants mimic the play of θ¯ against all incumbents of level n¯ (and the incumbents behave against the
mutants in the same way they behave against θ¯), the mutants mimic θ¯ when facing a mutant of the same type,
and mutants of type θ1 play the efficient profile (a1, a2) when they meet mutants of type θ2. In such a focal
post-entry configuration mutants on average earn a weakly higher fitness than θ¯ against the incumbents, and a
strictly higher fitness against the mutants. This implies that (µ∗, b∗) cannot be an NSC.
To prove part 2, assume to the contrary that
((
bθ¯ (θ) , bθ
(
θ¯
))) 6∈ FMDE (θ¯, θ). Suppose mutants of type
θˆ enter. Consider a post-entry configuration in which the incumbents keep playing their pre-entry play among
themselves, and the mutants mimic the play of θ¯, except that they play a fitness-maximising deception equilibria
against all lower types. The mutants obtains a weakly higher payoff than θ¯ against all types, and a strictly
higher payoff than θ¯ against some lower types. Thus (µ∗, b∗) cannot be an NSC.
To prove part 3, assume to the contrary that pi
(
bθ
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯ (θ)
)
> p¯i. Suppose mutants of type θˆ enter.
Consider a post-entry configuration in which the incumbents keep playing their pre-entry play among themselves,
while the mutants; (i) play fitness-maximising deception equilibria against lower types, (ii) mimic type θ against
type θ¯, and (iii) mimic the play of θ¯ in all other interactions. The type θˆ mutants earn strictly more than θ¯
against both θˆ and θ¯. The mutants earn weakly more than θ¯ against all other types. This implies that (µ∗, b∗)
cannot be an NSC.
Remark. The first part of Theorem 1 (a highest type must play an efficient strategy when meeting itself) is
similar to Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya’s (2007) Proposition 2, which shows that only efficient outcomes can be
stable in a setup with perfect observability and no deception. We should note that Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya
(2007) use a weaker notion of efficiency. An action is efficient in the sense of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)
(DEY-efficient) if its fitness is highest among the symmetric strategy profiles (i.e., action a is DEY-efficient
if pi (a, a) ≥ pi (σ, σ) for all strategies σ ∈ ∆ (A)). Observe that our notion of efficiency (Definition 7) implies
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DEY-efficiency, but the converse is not necessarily true. The weaker notion of DEY-efficiency is the relevant one
in the set up of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007), because they consider only monomorphic groups mutants;
i.e., all mutants who enter at the same time are of the same type. A similar result would also hold in our
setup, if we imposed a similar limitation on the set of feasible mutants. However, without such a limitation,
heterogeneous mutants can correlate their play, and our stronger notion of efficiency is required to characterize
stability.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is that a game that has only efficient asymmetric profiles does not admit
any NSCs.
Corollary 1. If G does not have an efficient profile that is symmetric (i.e., if pi (a, a) < p¯i for each a ∈ A),
then the game does not admit an NSC.
4.3 Characterization of Pure NSCs
We now present three results which, together with Theorem 1, allow us to completely characterize NSCs with
pure outcomes. The first proposition shows that in a pure NSC all incumbents have the minimal cognitive level,
since having a higher ability does not yield any advantage when everyone plays the same action.
Proposition 1. If (µ, a∗) is an NSC, and (u, n) ∈ C (µ), then n = 1.
Proof. Since all players earn the same game payoff of pi (a∗, a∗) , they must also incur the same cognitive cost,
or else the fitness of the different incumbent types would not be balanced (which contradicts (µ, a∗) being
an NSC). Moreover, this uniform cognitive level must be level 1. Otherwise a mutant of a lower level, who
strictly prefers to play a∗ against all actions, would strictly outperform the incumbents in nearby post-entry
focal configurations.
The following proposition shows that if k2 (the cost of having cognitive level 2) is sufficiently small, then
any outcome of a pure NSC must be a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. The reason is that if the pure
outcome were not a Nash equilibrium, then the population could be invaded by mutants of cognitive level 2,
who deceive the incumbents into thinking they face other incumbents, and best-reply to the incumbents’ play.
Proposition 2. Suppose
k2 < k¯ := min
a,a′,a′′ s.t. pi(a,a′′) 6=pi(a′,a′′)
|pi (a, a′′)− pi (a′, a′′)| . (1)
If (µ, a∗) is an NSC, then (a∗, a∗) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, in fitness payoffs.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that (µ, a∗) is a pure NSC and a∗ is not a best response to itself; i.e., there
exist a′ ∈ A such that pi (a′, a∗) > pi (a∗, a∗). Assume without loss of generality that a′ is a best reply against
a∗ (in fitness terms). By Proposition 1, all incumbents have cognitive level 1. Consider a mutant θ′ = (pi, 2)
of cognitive level 2 and materialistic preferences. There is a focal post-entry configuration in which mutants
play the deception equilibrium (a′, a∗) against the incumbents. Observe that the payoff is strictly higher when
mutants face an incumbent than when two incumbents face each other:
pi (a′, a∗)− k2 > pi (a′, a∗)− k¯ ≥ pi (a∗, a∗) .
This implies that if the mutants are sufficiently rare, they outperform the incumbents in the post-entry focal
configuration.
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The next proposition shows that any action that is both efficient and a strict Nash equilibrium, can be
induced as the outcome of an NSC. The intuition is as follows (and is similar to Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya,
2007, Proposition 6). Consider a monomorphic population in which all individuals are of cognitive level 1 and
have a dominant action that is an efficient strict Nash equilibrium action. The fact that the action profile is
strict Nash and efficient, implies that any group of mutants is weakly outperformed.
Proposition 3. If (a¯, a¯) is both efficient and a strict Nash equilibrium (in fitness payoffs), then there exists a
type distribution µ such that (µ, a¯) is an NSC.
Proof. Consider a monomorphic configuration (µ, a¯) consisting of type (θ∗, 1) where all incumbents are of
cognitive level 1 and of the same preference type θ∗, which strictly prefers to play a¯ regardless of what the
opponent plays. Observe, that after any mutant’s entry, in all focal post-entry configurations the incumbent θ∗
will always play a¯ (since a¯ is strictly dominant for θ∗). Since the incumbent is always playing a¯, and (a¯, a¯ ) is a
strict Nash equilibrium of G, mutants who do not play a¯ when they are matched with θ∗ will obtain strictly less
fitness than the incumbents if their population share is sufficiently small. But for mutants who play a¯ whenever
they are matched with θ∗, the incumbents’ average fitness is given by pi(a¯, a¯), and since mutants cannot obtain
an average fitness strictly higher than this when they are matched among themselves (since (a¯, a¯) is efficient),
they cannot obtain a strictly higher average fitness either. We conclude that (µ, a¯) is an NSC.
Part 1 of Theorem 1, and with Propositions 1–3 imply that pure NSCs outcomes are essentially efficient
Nash equilibria. Formally:
Corollary 2 (Characterization of pure NSCs).
1. If (a∗, a∗) is both efficient and a strict Nash equilibrium in fitness payoffs, then it is the outcome of a pure
NSC.
2. If (a∗, a∗) is the outcome of a pure NSC and k2 < k¯, then it is both efficient and a Nash equilibrium in
fitness payoffs.
4.4 Characterization of NSCs in Generic Games
In this section we characterize NSCs in generic games, by which we mean games in which any two different
action profiles both give an individual player different payoffs, and yield different total payoffs.
Definition 10. A (symmetric) game is generic if for each a, a′, b, b′ ∈ A, {a, a′} 6= {b, b′} implies:
pi (a, a′) 6= pi (b, b′) , and pi (a, a′) + pi (a′, a) 6= pi (b, b′) + pi (b′, b) .
For example, if the entries of the payoff matrix pi are drawn from a continuous distribution on an open
subset of the real numbers, then the induced game is generic with probability one.
Note that a generic game admits at most one efficient action profile. From Corollary 1 we know that if
the game does not have a symmetric efficient profile then it does not admit any NSC. Hence we can restrict
attention to games with exactly one efficient action. Let a¯ denote this unique efficient action.
Next we present the main result of the paper: all incumbent types play efficiently in any NSC of a generic
game.
Theorem 2. If (µ∗, b∗) is an NSC of a generic game with a (unique) efficient outcome (a¯, a¯), then (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) =
(a¯, a¯), for all θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
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Proof. Assume to the contrary that configuration (µ∗, b∗) is an NSC such that (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) 6= (a¯, a¯) for some
types θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗). Let θ˚ be the type with the highest cognitive level among the types that satisfy at least one
of the following conditions:
(A) θ˚ plays inefficiently against itself, i.e.,
(
bθ˚
(
θ˚
)
, bθ˚
(
θ˚
))
6= (a¯, a¯)).
(B) θ˚ plays inefficiently against a weakly higher type, i.e.,
(
bθ˚ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ˚
))
6= (a¯, a¯) for some θ′ 6= θ˚ with
nθ˚ ≤ nθ′ .
(C) A strictly lower type earns strictly more than p¯i against θ˚, i.e., pi
(
bθ˚ (θ′′) , bθ′′
(
θ˚
))
> p¯i for some θ′′ 6= θ˚
with nθ˚ > nθ′′ .
We will now successively rule out each of these cases.
Assume first that (A) holds. Let uˆ be a utility function that is identical to uθ except that: (i) the payoff of
the outcome (a¯, a¯) is increased by the minimal amount required to make it a best reply to itself, and (ii) the
payoff of some other outcome is altered slightly (to ensure uˆ is not already an incumbent) in a way that does not
force θˆ to behave differently from θ. (The formal definition of uˆ is provided in Appendix A.3.) Suppose that a
mutant of type θˆ =
(
θˆ, nθ
)
enters. Consider a focal post-entry configuration in which the type θˆ mutants mimic
the play of the type θ˚ incumbents in all matches except: (i) the mutants play the efficient profile (a¯, a¯) among
themselves (which yields a higher payoff than what θ¯ achieves when matched against θ˚), and (ii) when the
mutants face a higher type they play either (a¯, a¯) or the same deception equilibrium that the higher types play
against θ¯. It follows that the mutants θˆ earn a strictly higher payoff than θ˚ against θˆ, and a weakly higher fitness
than type θ against all other types. Thus the mutants strictly outperform the incumbents, which contradicts
the assumption that (µ∗, b∗) is an NSC. The full technical details of this argument are given in Appendix A.3.
Next, assume that case (B) holds and that case (A) does not hold. This implies that:
0.5 · (pi (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) + pi (bθ′ (θ) , bθ (θ′))) < p¯i = pi (bθ (θ) , bθ (θ)) = pi (bθ′ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ′)) .
That is, in the subpopulation that includes types θ and θ′ the within-type matchings yield higher payoffs
than out-group matchings (an average payoff of less than p¯i). The following formal argument shows that this
property implies dynamic instability. The fact that (µ∗, b∗) is an NSC implies that µ∗ is an NSS in the type
game Γ(µ∗,b∗). Let B be the payoff matrix of the type game Γ(µ∗,b∗) and let n = |C (µ∗)|. It is well known (e.g.,
Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988, Exercise 6.4.3, and Hofbauer, 2011, pp. 1–2) that an interior Nash equilibrium
of a normal form game can be an NSS if and only if the payoff matrix is negative semi-definite with respect to
the tangent space, i.e., if and only if x · Bx ≤ 0 for each x ∈ Rn such that ∑i xi = 0. Assume without loss
of generality that type θ (θ′) is represented by the jth (kth) row of the matrix B. Let the column vector x be
defined as follows:
x (i) =

1 i = j
−1 i = k
0 i 6= j, k.
That is, the vector x has all entries equal to zero, except the jth entry which is equal to 1, and the kth entry
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which is equal to −1. We have:
x ·Bx = Bjj −Bjk −Bjk +Bkk
= a¯− knθj + a¯− knθk −
(
pi (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ))− knθ + pi (bθ′ (θ) , bθ (θ′))− knθk
)
= 2 · a¯− (pi (bθj (θk) , bθk (θj))+ pi (bθk (θj) , bθj (θk))) > 0.
Thus B is not negative semidefinite.
Finally, assume that only case (C) holds. Let θ¯ be an incumbent type with the highest cognitive level. The
fact that case (B) does not hold implies that
(
bθ˚
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯
(
θ˚
))
= (a¯, a¯), and so pi
(
bθ¯
(
θ˚
)
, bθ˚
(
θ¯
))
= p¯i. The
fact that case (C) holds implies that pi
(
bθ′′
(
θ˚
)
, bθ˚ (θ′′)
)
> p¯i (and, in particular, that bθ˚ (θ′′) ∈ Σθ˚). This
contradicts part (2) of Theorem 1, according to which we should have
(
bθ¯
(
θ˚
)
, bθ˚
(
θ¯
))
= FMDE
(
θ¯, θ˚
)
.
Note that in a generic game any pure action is either a strict equilibrium, or not a best reply to itself.
Combining the results of this section with the above characterization of pure NSCs yields the following corollary,
which fully characterizes the NSCs of generic games.
Corollary 3 (Characterization of NSCs in Generic Games). Let G be a generic game.
1. If (a∗, a∗) is an efficient Nash equilibrium in fitness payoffs, then (a∗, a∗) is the outcome of a pure NSC.
2. If (µ∗, b∗) is an NSC and k2 < k¯, then the NSC is pure, i.e., b∗ ≡ a∗, with the outcome (a∗, a∗) being an
efficient Nash equilibrium in fitness payoffs.
3. If G does not have an efficient symmetric Nash equilibrium, then G does not admit any NSC.
4.5 Non-Pure NSCs in Non-generic Games
The previous two subsections fully characterizes (i) pure NSCs and (ii) NSCs in generic games. In this section we
analyse non-pure NCSs in non-generic games. Non-generic games may be of interest in various setups, such as:
(1) normal-form representation of generic extensive form games (the induced matrix is typically non-generic),
and (2) special interesting families of games, such as zero-sum games. Unlike generic games, non-generic games
can admit (non-pure) NSCs with multiple cognitive levels and non-Nash behaviour. To demonstrate this we
consider the Rock-Paper-Scissors game, with the following payoff matrix:
R P S
R 0, 0 −1, 1 1,−1
P 1,−1 0, 0 −1, 1
S −1, 1 1,−1 0, 0
.
The result below shows that, under mild assumptions on the cognitive costs function, this game admits
an NSC in which all players have the same materialistic preferences, but players of different cognitive levels
coexist, and non-Nash profiles are played in all matches between two individuals of different cognitive levels.
More precisely, when individuals of different cognitive levels meet, the higher-level individual deceives the lower-
level individual to take a pure action that the higher-level individual then best-responds to. Thus the higher-level
individual earns 1 and her opponent earns −1. Individuals of the same cognitive level play the unique Nash
equilibrium. This means that higher-level types will obtain a payoff of 1 more often than lower-level types,
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and lower-level types will obtain a payoff of −1 more often than higher-level types. In the NSC this payoff
difference is offset exactly by the higher cognitive cost paid by the higher types. Moreover, the cognitive cost is
increasing such that at some point the cost of cognition outweighs any payoff differences that may arise from the
underlying game. This implies that there is an upper bound on the cognitive sophistication in the population.
Proposition 4. Let G be a Rock-Paper-Scissors game. Let upi denote the (materialistic) preference such that
upi (a, a′) = pi (a, a′) for all profiles (a, a′). Suppose that the marginal cognitive cost is small but non-vanishing,
so that (a) there is an N such that kN ≤ 2 < kN+1, and (b) it holds that11 1 > kn+1− kn for all n ≤ N . There
exists an NSC (µ∗, b∗), such that C (µ∗) ⊆ {(upi, n)}Nn=1, and µ∗ is mixed (i.e., |C (µ∗)| > 1). The behaviour of
the incumbent types is as follows: if the individuals in a match are of different cognitive levels, then the higher
level plays Paper and the lower level plays Rock; if both individuals in a match are of the same cognitive level,
then they both play the unique Nash equilibrium (i.e., randomize uniformly over the three actions).
Appendix C.2 contains a formal proof of this result an relates it to a similar construction in Conlisk (2001).
5 Non-observability among Cognitive Equals
The main model assumes that types with equal cognitive levels can observe each others preferences. In this
section we present an alternative “tie-breaking rule” according to which a player is unable to observe the
preferences of an opponent with the same cognitive level.
5.1 Changes to the Baseline Model
Play between Types with Equal Cognitive Levels. If two individuals of the same cognitive cognitive level
are matched to play, then they play a Bayes–Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game in which each player knows
only that her opponent has the same cognitive level (but she cannot observe her opponent’s preferences). Given
a distribution of types µ, we say that n ∈ projNC (µ) if there exists a type (u, n) ∈ C (µ). Given a distribution
µ and n ∈ projNC (µ), let Θn denote the set of types with level n, and let µn denote the distribution of types
conditional on having cognitive level n:
µn (u, n) =
µ (u, n)∑
(u′,n)∈C(µ) µ (u′, n)
.
Given distribution µ and n ∈ projNC (µ), a vector of action profiles (σθ)θ∈Θn is a Bayes–Nash equilibrium of
the game between types with level n, if each player best-replies to the aggregate behaviour of players of the
same cognitive level. Let BNE (n) ⊆ (∆A)|Θn| be the set of Bayes–Nash equilibria of the game induced by the
interactions between players of cognitive level n, i.e.,
BNE (n) =
{
(σθ)θ∈Θn ∈ (∆A)
|Θn| : ∀σ(u,n) ∈ Θn, σ(u,n) ∈ argmaxσ∈∆(A)
∑
θ∈Θn
µn (θ) · u (σ, σθ)
}
.
The play among types with equal levels is analogous to the play of all types in the unobservable case of
Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007, Section 4). Players with different cognitive levels play deception equilibria as
in the baseline model.
11If we define k¯ as in Eq. (1) then we have δ = 1, in Proposition 4. Thus the condition that k¯ > kn+1−kn for all n in Proposition
4, may be viewed as an extension of the condition k2 < k¯ in Proposition 2.
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Redefining Configurations. We redefine the notion of a configuration as follows:
Definition 11. A configuration is a pair (µ, b) where µ ∈ ∆ (U) is a type distribution, and b : C (µ)×C (µ) −→
∆ (A) is a behaviour policy such that:
1. Players play the same against all opponents of the same level, i.e., for each n ∈ projNC (µ), if θ, θ′, θ′′ ∈ Θn
then bθ (θ′) = bθ (θ′′).
2. Types with the same level play a Bayes–Nash equilibrium, i.e., for each n ∈ projNC (µ)(
(bθ (θ))θ∈Θn
) ∈ BNE (n) .
3. Types with different levels play deception equilibria, i.e., for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ) :
nθ > nθ′ =⇒ (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) ∈ DE (θ, θ′) .
Redefining NSC. Unlike in the baseline model, focal configurations (in which the incumbents keep their pre-
entry play) do not always exist. Accordingly, we modify the definition of NSC slightly to require the existence
of a focal configuration for any given distribution of mutants.12 Formally:
Definition 12. A configuration (µ, b) is a neutrally stable configuration (NSC), if for every µ′ ∈ ∆ (Θ), there
is some ε¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all ε ∈ (0, ε¯), it holds that; (1) there exists a focal configuration (µ˜, b˜), where
µ˜ = (1− ε) · µ+ ε · µ′, and (2) for each such focal configuration (µ˜, b˜), the distribution µ is an NSS in the type
game Γ(µ˜,b˜).
5.2 Results
The following simple results show that with non-observable equals, it is no longer the case that stable outcomes
must be efficient. The first result shows that any strict Nash equilibrium (even an inefficient) is the outcome
of a pure NSC. The argument is similar to Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007, Proposition 5-b) and is presented
briefly.
Proposition 5. If (a∗, a∗) is a strict Nash equilibrium, then there exists a pure NSC (µ, a∗), where µ contains
a single type (1, u∗) and a∗ is a strictly dominant action given the utility function u∗.
Proof. Observe that the incumbents always play a∗ in any focal configuration (and that such a focal configuration
always exists). The fact that a∗ is a strict equilibrium implies that any mutant who does not always play a∗
against the incumbents is strictly outperformed if the mutants are sufficiently rare. If the mutant type has level
one, it implies that she must always play a∗ also against mutants, and that she achieves the same payoff as
the incumbents. If the mutant has higher cognitive level, then if the mutants are sufficiently rare the higher
cognitive cost implies that the mutant is strictly outperformed.
The next result shows that players with the highest type must play a Nash equilibrium (of the underlying
game) among themselves. The argument is similar to Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007, Proposition 5-a) and is
presented briefly.
12All the results remain the same if one only requires δ-focality a` la Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)
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Proposition 6. Let (µ∗, b∗) be an NSC and let n¯ be the highest cognitive level. The action profile (bθ (θ))θ∈Θn¯
is a Bayes–Nash equilibrium of the fitness game. That is:
∀θ∗ ∈ Θn¯, bθ∗ (θ∗) ∈ argmaxσ∈∆(A)
∑
θ∈Θn
µn (θ) · pi (σ, bθ (θ)) .
Proof. Assume to the contrary that the highest types do not play a Bayes–Nash equilibrium of the fitness game.
Let θ¯ ∈ Θn¯ be one such type. That is:
bθ∗ (θ∗) /∈ argmaxσ∈∆(A)
∑
θ∈Θn
µn (θ) · pi (σ, bθ (θ)) .
Let θ′ = (u′, n¯) be a mutant type which is indifferent between any two outcomes, and which mimics the play
of θ∗ against lower types, while best-replying in the induced fitness game between the highest types. Such a
mutant type would strictly outperform the incumbent θ¯ in any focal configuration.
6 Type-Interdependent Preferences
In this section we describe an extension of our baseline model, such that the preferences may depend not only
on action profiles, but also on the opponent’s type.
6.1 Changes to the Baseline Model
We briefly describe how to amend the model to handle type-interdependent preferences. Our construction is
similar to that of Herold and Kuzmics (2009).
When the preferences of a type depend on the opponent’s type, we can no longer work with the set of all
possible preferences, because it would create problems of circularity and cardinality.13 Instead, we must restrict
attention to a pre-specified set of feasible preferences. We begin by defining ΘID as an arbitrary set of labels.
Each label is a pair θ = (u, n) ∈ ΘID, where n ∈ N and u is a type-interdependent utility function that depends
on the played action profile as well as the opponent’s label,
u : A×A×ΘID → R.
Each label θ = (u, n) may now be interpreted as a type. The definition of u extends to mixed actions in the
obvious way. We use the label u also to describe its associated utility function u. Thus u (σ, σ′, θ′) denotes the
subjective payoff that a player with preferences u earns when she plays strategy σ against an opponent with
type θ′ who plays strategy σ′.
Let UID denote the set of all preferences that are part of some type in ΘID, i.e., UID = {u : ∃n ∈ N
s.t. (u, n) ∈ ΘID}. For each type-neutral preference u ∈ U we can define an equivalent type-interdependent
preference u ∈ UID, which is independent of the opponent’s type; that is, u′ (σ, σ′, θ′) = u′′ (σ, σ′, θ′′) for each
u′, u′′ ∈ UID. Let UN denote the set of all such type-interdependent versions of the type-neutral preferences of
the baseline model. All of our results allow, but do not require, that UN ⊆ UID.
13The circularity comes from the fact that each type contains a preferences component, which is identified with a utility function
defined over types (and action profiles). To see that this creates a problem if the set of types is unrestricted, let Θ∗ be the set of
types and suppose that the corresponding set of preferences, U∗, contains all mappings u : A × A × Θ∗ → R. The cardinality of
this set is |U | · |Θ∗|, but if U∗ is indeed the set of all mappings u : A × A × Θ∗ → R, then we must have |U∗| = |U | · |Θ∗|. Since
|Θ∗| ≥ |U∗| this is a contradiction. See also footnote 10 in Herold and Kuzmics (2009).
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Next, we amend the definitions of Nash equilibrium, undominated strategies, and deception equilibrium. The
best-reply correspondence now takes both strategies and types as arguments: BRu (σ′, θ′) = arg maxσ∈∆(A) u (σ, σ′, θ′).
Accordingly we adjust the definition of the set of Nash equilibria,
NE (θ, θ′) = {(σ, σ′) ∈ ∆ (A)×∆ (A) : σ ∈ BRu (σ′, θ′) and σ′ ∈ BRu′ (σ, θ)} ,
and the set of undominated strategies
Σ (θ) = {σ ∈ ∆ (A) : there exists σ′ ∈ ∆ (A) and θ′ ∈ ΘID such that σ ∈ BRu (σ′, θ′)} .
Finally, we adapt the definition of deception equilibrium. Given two types θ, θ′ with nθ > nθ′ , a strategy profile
(σ˜, σ˜′) is a deception equilibrium if
(σ˜, σ˜′) ∈ arg max
σ∈∆(A),σ′∈Σ(θ′)
uθ (σ, σ′, θ′) .
Let DE (θ, θ′) be the set of all such deception equilibria. The rest of our model remains unchanged.
6.2 Pure Maxmin and Minimal Fitness
The pure maxmin and minmax values give a minimal bound to the fitness of an NSC. Given a game G = (A, pi) ,
define M(M¯) as its pure maxmin (minmax) value:
M = max
a1∈A
min
a2∈A
pi (a1, a2) , M = min
a2∈A
max
a1∈A
pi (a1, a2) .
The pure maxmin value M
¯
is the minimal fitness payoff a player can guarantee herself in the sequential game in
which she plays first, and the opponent replies in an arbitrary way (i.e., not necessarily in a way that maximizes
the opponent’s fitness.) The pure minmax valueM is the minimal fitness payoff a player can guarantee herself in
the sequential game in which her opponent plays first an arbitrary action, and she best-replies to the opponent’s
pure action. It is immediate that M ≤ M, and that the minmax value in mixed actions is between these two
values.
Let aM
¯
be a maxmin action of a player; an action aM
¯
guarantees that the player’s payoff is at least M
¯
,
aM ∈ arg max
a1∈A
min
a2∈A
pi (a1, a2) .
The next proposition (which holds also in the baseline model with type-neutral preferences) shows that the
maxmin value is a lower bound on the fitness payoff obtained in an NSC. The intuition is that if the payoff is
lower, then a mutant of cognitive level 1, with preferences such that the maxmin action aM is dominant, will
outperform the incumbents.
Definition 13. Given a pure action a∗ ∈ A, let ua∗ ∈ UN be the (type-neutral) preferences in which the player
obtains a payoff of 1 if she plays a∗ and a payoff of 0 otherwise (i.e., a∗ is a dominant action regardless of the
opponent’s preferences).
Proposition 7. Suppose that (uaM , 1) ∈ ΘID. If (µ, b) is an NSC then Π (µ, b) ≥M .
Proof. Assume to the contrary that Π (µ, b) < M . Consider a monomorphic group of mutants with type
19
(uaM , 1) . The fact that aM is a maxmin action implies that
pi(uaM ,1)
((
µ˜, b˜
)) ≥M
in any post-entry configuration. Furthermore, due to continuity it holds that Πθ
(
µ˜, b˜
)
< M for any θ ∈ C (µ)
in all sufficiently close focal post-entry configuration. This contradicts µ being an NSS in Γ(µ˜,b˜), and thus it
contradicts (µ, b) being an NSC.
6.3 characterization of Pure Stable Configurations
In this subsection we show that, essentially, a pure action can be an outcome of an ESC if and only if it is a
Nash equilibrium that yields each player a payoff above her minmax/maxmin value.
We first adapt Propositions 1–2 to the current setup. Specifically, we show that if (µ∗, a∗) is a pure NSC,
then: (1) all incumbents have the same cognitive level, and (2) a∗ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, provided
that the marginal cognitive costs are sufficiently small (smaller than k¯, as defined in Eq. (1)).
Proposition 8. If (µ∗, a∗) is a pure NSC then the following holds:
1. If θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) then nθ = nθ′ .
2. If kn+1 − kn < k¯ for each n, then (a∗, a∗) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in fitness payoffs.
Proof.
1. Since all players earn the same game payoff of pi (a∗, a∗) , they must also incur the same cognitive cost, or
else the fitness of the different incumbent types would not be balanced (which contradicts the fact that
(µ, a∗) is an NSC).
2. Assume to the contrary that there exist a′ ∈ A such that pi (a′, a∗) > pi (a∗, a∗). Assume without loss of
generality that a′ is a best reply against a∗ (in fitness terms). By the previous part all the incumbents
have the same cognitive level n. Consider a monomorphic group of mutants θ′ = (pi, n+ 1). There is
a focal post-entry configuration in which the mutants play the deception equilibrium (a′, a∗) against the
incumbents. Observe that the mutants obtain a strictly higher payoff when facing an incumbent than the
payoff of two incumbents who face each other:
pi (a′, a∗)− (kn+1 − kn) > pi (a′, a∗)− k¯ ≥ pi (a∗, a∗) .
This implies that if the mutants are sufficiently rare, they outperform the incumbents in the post-entry
focal configuration.
Let aM¯ be a minmax action, i.e., an action that guarantees that the opponent’s payoff is at most M¯ ;
aM¯ ∈ arg min
a2∈A
max
a1∈A
pi (a1, a2) .
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Definition 14. Given any two actions a˜, a˜′ ∈ A, let ua˜a˜′ be the discriminating preferences defined by the
following utility function: For all a′,
ua˜a˜′ (a, a′, θ′) =

1 if uθ′ = ua˜a˜′ and a = a˜
1 if uθ′ 6= ua˜a˜′ and a = a˜′
0 otherwise.
In words, the preferences ua˜a˜′ are such that a˜ is a dominant action against an opponent with the same
preferences, and a˜′ is the dominant action against all other opponents.
The following result shows that any action a∗ that is both a symmetric Nash equilibrium and yields a payoff
above the minmax value can be implemented as the unique pure outcome of an ESC. (Recall that θ is used to
denote that probability distribution µ puts all weight on θ, i.e., µ (θ) = 1.)
Proposition 9. Suppose that
(
ua∗aM¯ , 1
)
∈ ΘID. If action (a∗, a∗) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium and
pi (a∗, a∗) > M, then
((
ua∗aM¯ , 1
)
, a∗
)
is an ESC.
Proof. Suppose that all incumbents are of type
(
ua∗aM¯ , 1
)
. Note that in all focal post-entry configurations the
incumbent
(
ua∗aM¯ , 1
)
always plays either a∗ or aM¯ . Against a mutant (θ, 1) with cognitive level 1, an incumbent
plays a∗ if and only if u (θ) = ua∗aM¯ . The fact that pi (a
∗, a∗) > M implies that any mutant θ 6=
(
ua∗aM¯ , 1
)
earns
a strictly lower payoff against the incumbents in any post-entry configuration. As a result, if the frequency of
mutants is sufficiently small, then they are strictly outperformed. Against a mutant (θ, n) with cognitive level
n > 1, an incumbent may play either a∗ or aM¯ . Since a∗ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium and pi (a∗, a∗) > M
the mutants earn at most pi (a∗, a∗) in matches against incumbents. Consequently, as the fraction of mutants
vanishes the average fitness of mutants is weakly less than pi (a∗, a∗) − kn, and the average fitness of the
incumbents is pi (a∗, a∗). Since k is strictly increasing this implies that
((
ua∗aM¯ , 1
)
, a∗
)
is an ESC.
The results of this section imply the following corollary, which characterizes pure outcomes of stable config-
urations in terms of being Nash equilibria that yield payoffs above the pure maxmin/minmax values.
Corollary 4. Suppose that (uaM , 1) ∈ ΘID and
(
ua∗aM¯ , 1
)
∈ ΘID.
1. If (a∗, a∗) is a Nash equilibrium and pi (a∗, a∗) > M¯, then a∗ is the outcome of a pure ESC.
2. If a∗ is the outcome of a pure NSC, and kn+1 − kn < k¯ for all n, then (a∗, a∗) is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium and pi (a∗, a∗) ≥M.
6.4 Application: In-group Cooperation and Out-group Exploitation
The following table represents a family of Hawk-Dove games. When both players play D (Dove) they earn 1
each and when they both play H (Hawk) they earn 0. When a player plays H against an opponent playing D,
she obtains an additional gain of g > 0 and the opponent incurs a loss of l ∈ (0, 1).
H D
H 0, 0 1 + g, 1− l
D 1− l, 1 + g 1, 1
. (2)
It is natural to think of mutual play of D as the cooperative outcome. We define preferences that induce players
to cooperate with their own kind and to seek to exploit those who are not of their own kind.
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Definition 15. Let un denote the preferences such that:
(1) If uθ′ = un and nθ′ = n then un (D, a′, θ′) = 1 and un (H, a′, θ′) = 0 for all a′.
(2) If uθ′ 6= un or nθ′ 6= n then un (H, a′, θ′) = 1 and un (D, a′, θ′) = 0 for all a′.
Thus, facing someone who is of the same type, an individual with un-preferences strictly prefers cooperation,
in the sense of playing D. When facing someone who is not of the same type, an individual with un-preferences
prefers the exploitative outcome (H,D), and after that she prefers the destructive outcome (H,H) over the
remaining outcomes.
Under the assumption that g > l and that the marginal cognitive costs are sufficiently small (but non-
vanishing), we construct an ESC in which only individuals with preferences from {ui}∞i=1 are present. Individuals
of different cognitive levels coexist, and non-Nash profiles are played in all matches between equals. When
individuals of the same level meet, they play mutual cooperation (D,D). When individuals of different levels
meet, the higher level plays H and the lower level plays D. The gain from obtaining the high payoff of 1 + g
against lower types is exactly counterbalanced by the higher cognitive costs. In contrast, if g < l then the game
does not admit this kind of stable configuration.
Proposition 10. Let G be the game represented in (2), where g > 0 and l ∈ (0, 1). Suppose that the marginal
cognitive cost is small but non-vanishing, so that (a) there is an N such that kN ≤ l + g < kN+1, and (b) it
holds that g > kn+1 − kn for all n ≤ N .
(i) If g > l then there exists an ESC (µ∗, b∗), such that C (µ∗) ⊆ {(un, n)}Nn=1, and µ∗ is mixed (i.e.,
|C (µ∗)| > 1). The behaviour of the incumbents is as follows: if the individuals in a match are of different
cognitive levels, then the higher level plays H and the lower level plays D; if both individuals in a match are of
the same cognitive level, then they both play D.
(ii) If g = l then there exists an NSC with the above properties.
(iii) If g < l then there does not exist any NSC (µ∗, b∗), such that C (µ∗) ⊆ {(un, n)}∞n=1.
The formal proof is presented in Appendix C.3.
7 Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
We have developed a model in which preferences coevolve with the ability to detect others’ preferences and
misrepresent one’s own preferences. To do so, we have allowed for heterogeneity with respect to costly cognitive
ability. The assumption of an exogenously given level of observability of the opponent’s preferences, which has
characterized the indirect evolutionary approach up until now, is replaced by a Machiavellian notion of deception
equilibrium, which endogenously determines what each player observes. Only when players in a match are of
the same cognitive level do they mutually observe each other’s preferences. Our main results surprisingly show
that this “grain” of perfect observability among equals is enough to imply that only efficient configurations can
be stable. Moreover, we show that if the marginal cognitive cost is not too high then only Nash equilibria can
be stable. Previous research has shown that if preferences are perfectly (or almost perfectly) observable, then
efficiency is necessary for stability (Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007). Previous research has also shown that if
preferences are not at all observable, then Nash equilibrium is necessary for stability (Ok and Vega-Redondo,
2001; Ely and Yilankaya, 2001). In our model, with endogenous observability of preferences we find that both
efficiency and Nash equilibrium are necessary conditions for stability (provided that the marginal cognitive cost
is not too high).
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We verify that if players with equal levels cannot observe each other’s preferences, then stable configurations
do not have to be efficient. Instead, they are closely related to Nash equilibria of the underlying games. This
should not come as a surprise since this alternative tie-breaking rule removes the last grain of mutual observation.
Our model assumes a very powerful form of deception. This allows us to derive sharp results that clearly
demonstrate effects of endogenising observation, and introducing deception. We think that the “Bayesian”
deception is an interesting model for future research: each incumbent type is associated with a signal, agents
with high cognitive levels can mimic the signals of types with lower cognitive levels, and agents maximize their
preferences given the received signals and the correct Bayesian inference about the opponent’s type.
In a companion paper (Heller and Mohlin, 2015) we study environments in which players are randomly
matched, and make inferences about the opponent’s type by observing her past behaviour (rather than observing
the type directly as is standard in the “indirect evolutionary approach”). In future research, it would be
interesting to combine both approaches and allow the observation of the past behaviour to be influenced by
deception.
Most papers taking the indirect evolutionary approach study the stability of preferences defined over material
outcomes. Moreover, it is common to restrict attention to some parameterised class of such preferences. Since
we study preferences defined on the more abstract level of action profiles (or the joint set of action profiles and
opponent’s types in the case of type-interdependent preferences) we do not make predictions about whether
some particular kind of preferences over material outcomes, from a particular family of utility functions, will
be stable or not. It would be interesting to extend our model to such classes of preferences. Furthermore, with
preferences defined over material outcomes it would be possible to study coevolution of preferences and deception
not only in isolated games, but also when individuals play many different games using the same preferences.
We hope to come back to these questions and we invite others to employ and modify our framework in these
directions.
A Formal Proofs of Theorems 1–2
A.1 Preliminaries
This subsection contains notation and definitions that will be used in the following proofs.
A generous action is an action such that if played by the opponent, it allows a player to achieve the maximal
fitness payoff. Formally:
Definition 16. Action ag ∈ A is generous, if there exists an a ∈ A such that pi (a, ag) ≥ pi (a′, a′′) for all
a′, a′′ ∈ A.
Fix a generous action ag ∈ A of the game G. A second-best generous action is an action such that if played
by the opponent, it allows a player to achieve the fitness payoff which is maximal under the constraint that the
opponent is not allowed to play the generous action ag. Formally:
Definition 17. Action ag2 ∈ A is second-best generous, conditional on ag ∈ A being first-best generous, if there
exists a ∈ A such that pi (a, ag2) ≥ pi (a′, a′′) for all a′, a′′ ∈ A such that a′′ 6= ag.
Fix a generous action ag ∈ A, and fix a second-best generous action ag2 ∈ A, conditional on ag ∈ A being
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first-best generous. For each α ≥ β ≥ 0, let uα,β be the following utility function:
uα,β (a, a′) =

α a′ = ag
β a′ = ag2
0 otherwise.
Observe that such a utility functionuα,β satisfies:
1. Indifference: the utility function only depends on the opponent’s action; i.e., the player is indifferent
between any two of her own actions.
2. Pro-generosity: the utility is highest if the opponent plays the generous action, second-highest if the
opponent plays the second-best generous action, and lowest otherwise.
Let UGI = {uα,β |α ≥ β ≥ 0} be the family of all such preferences, called pro-generous indifferent preferences.
Note that Ug includes a continuum of different utilities (under the assumption that G includes at least three
actions). Thus for any set of incumbent types we can always find a utility function in Ug which is does not
belong to any of the current incumbents.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1 (Behaviour of the Highest Types)
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 1, Part 1
Assume to the contrary that pi
(
bθ¯
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯
(
θ¯
))
< p¯i. (Note that the definition of p¯i implies that the opposite
inequality is impossible.) Let a1, a2 ∈ A be any two actions such that (a1, a2) is an efficient action profile, i.e.,
0.5 · (pi (a1, a2) + pi (a1, a2)) = p¯i. Let θ1, θ2 be two types that satisfy the following conditions: (1) the types are
not incumbents: θ1, θ2 /∈ C (µ∗), (2) both types have the highest incumbent cognitive level: nθ1 = nθ2 = n¯, and
(3) both types have different pro-generosity indifferent preferences; uθ1 , uθ2 ∈ UGI and uθ1 6= uθ2 . Let µ′ be the
distribution that assigns mass 0.5 to each of these types. The post-entry type distribution is µ˜ = (1− )·µ+·µ′.
Let the post-entry behaviour policy b˜ be defined as follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality: b˜θ (θ′) = bθ (θ′) for each incumbent pair θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
2. In matches between mutants and incumbents of lower types, behaviour is such that the mutants maximize
their fitness:
(
b˜θi (θ′) , b˜θ′ (θi)
) ∈ FMDE (θi, θ′) for each i ∈ {1, 2} and θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) with nθ′ < n¯. Note
that FMDE (θi, θ′) is nonempty in virtue of the construction of UGI .
3. In matches between mutants and incumbents of the highest type, the mutants mimic θ¯ and the incumbents
of the highest type play the same way as they play against θ¯:
(
b˜θi (θ′) , b˜θ′ (θi)
)
=
(
bθ¯ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ¯
))
, for
each i ∈ {1, 2} and θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) with nθ′ = n¯.
4. Two mutants of different types play efficiently when meeting each other: b˜θi (θj) = ai for each i 6= j ∈
{1, 2}.
5. Two mutants of the same type play like θ¯ plays against itself, when meeting each other:b˜θi (θi) = bθ¯
(
θ¯
)
for each i ∈ {1, 2}.
In virtue of point 1 the construction
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ, b)). By point 2 the
mutants θ1 and θ2 earn weakly more than θ¯ against lower types. By point 3 the mutants earn exactly the same
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as θ¯ against all the highest incumbent types (including θ¯). By points 4 and 5 the mutants on average earn
strictly more than θ¯ against the mutants. In total average fitness earned by θ1 and θ2 is strictly higher than
that of θ¯, against a population that follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. This implies that µ′ is a strictly better reply against µ∗ in
the population game Γ(µ˜,b˜). Thus, µ
∗ is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and therefore it is not an NSS, in
Γ(µ˜,b˜), which implies that µ
∗ is not an NSC.
Remark 4. In this proof the mutants only outperform the incumbents on average. This allows for the possibility
that one mutant earns strictly less than θ¯, while the other mutant earns strictly more than θ¯. That is enough
to prove the desired result. However, we could also have proved our result with a construction involving three
different mutants θ1, θ2, θ3 , each of whom earns strictly more than θ¯ in the post-entry configuration. This would
be achieved if the three mutant types were equally frequent, and any two mutants of the same type played the
same way θ¯ plays against itself (point 5 above), but played as follows when facing another mutant: (i) mutant
θ1 plays a1 against θ2 and a2 against θ3, (ii) mutant θ2 plays a1 against θ3 and a2 against θ1, and (iii) mutant
θ3 plays a1 against θ1 and a2 against θ2.
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 1, Part 2
Assume to the contrary that
((
bθ¯ (θ) , bθ
(
θ¯
))) 6∈ FMDE (θ¯, θ). Let θˆ be a type that satisfies: (1) not being an
incumbent: θˆ /∈ C (µ∗), (2) having the highest incumbent cognitive level: nθˆ = n¯, and (3) having pro-generous
indifferent preferences: uθˆ ∈ UGI . Let µ′ be the distribution that assigns mass one to type θˆ. The post-entry
type distribution is µ˜ = (1− ) · µ+  · µ′. Let the post-entry behaviour policy b˜ be defined as follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality: b˜θ (θ′) = bθ (θ′) for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
2. In matches between mutants and incumbents of lower types, behaviour is such that the mutants maximize
their fitness:
(
b˜θˆ (θ′) , b˜θ′
(
θˆ
))
∈ FMDE
(
θˆ, θ′
)
for each θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) with nθ′ < n¯.
3. In matches between mutants and incumbents of the highest type, the mutant mimics θ¯ and the higher
types play the same way they play against θ¯:
(
b˜θˆ (θ′) , b˜θ′
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bθ¯ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ¯
))
, for each θ′ ∈ C (µ∗)
with nθ′ = n¯.
4. The mutant θˆ plays against itself the same way θ¯ plays against itself:
(
b˜θˆ
(
θˆ
)
, b˜θˆ
(
θˆ
))
=
(
b˜θ¯
(
θ¯
)
, b˜θ¯
(
θ¯
))
.
Note that
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ, b)), and that θˆ obtains a strictly higher fitness
than θ¯ against a population that follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. This implies that µ′ is a strictly better reply against µ∗ in
the population game Γ(µ˜,b˜). Thus, µ
∗ is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and therefore it is not an NSS, in
Γ(µ˜,b˜), which implies that µ
∗ is not an NSC.
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 1, Part 3
Assume to the contrary that pi
(
bθ
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯ (θ)
)
> p¯i, which immediately implies that pi
(
bθ¯ (θ) , bθ
(
θ¯
))
< p¯i. Let
θˆ be a type that satisfies: (1) not being an incumbent: θˆ /∈ C (µ∗), (2) having the highest incumbent cognitive
level: nθˆ = n¯, and (3) having pro-generous indifferent preferences: uθˆ ∈ UGI . Let µ′ be the distribution that
assigns mass one to type θˆ. The post-entry type distribution is µ˜ = (1− ) · µ +  · µ′. Let the post-entry
behaviour policy b˜ be defined as follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality: b˜θ (θ′) = bθ (θ′) for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
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2. In matches between mutants and incumbents of lower types, behaviour is such that the mutants maximize
their fitness:
(
b˜θˆ (θ′) , b˜θ′
(
θˆ
))
∈ FMDE
(
θˆ, θ′
)
for each θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) with nθ′ < n¯.
3. In a match between a mutant θˆ and the incumbent θ¯, the mutant mimics θ, and the incumbent θ¯ plays
the same way it plays against θ:
(
b˜θˆ
(
θ¯
)
, b˜θ¯
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bθ
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯ (θ)
)
.
4. The mutant θˆ plays against itself the same way θ¯ plays against itself:
(
b˜θˆ
(
θˆ
)
, b˜θˆ
(
θˆ
))
=
(
b˜θ¯
(
θ¯
)
, b˜θ¯
(
θ¯
))
.
5. The mutantθˆ mimics θ¯ against all other highest types, and these higher types play against θˆ in the same
way as they play against θ¯:
(
b˜θˆ (θ′) , b˜θ′
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bθ¯ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ¯
))
for each θ′ 6= θ¯ with nθ′ = n¯.
Note that
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ, b)). By point 2 the mutant θˆ earns weakly more
than θ¯ against lower types. By point 3 and Theorem 1.1, the mutants earn strictly more than θ¯ against type θ¯.
By points 3 and 4 and Theorem 1.1, the mutant earns strictly more than θ¯ against the mutant. By point 5 the
mutant θˆ earns the same as θ¯ against all other types. In total the average fitness earned by θˆ is strictly higher
than that of θ¯, against a population that follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. This implies that µ′ is a strictly better reply against µ∗
in the population game Γ(µ˜,b˜). Thus, µ
∗ is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and therefore it is not an NSS,
in Γ(µ˜,b˜), which implies that µ
∗ is not an NSC.
A.3 Proof of Case (1) in Theorem 2
In what follows we fill in the missing technical details for the part of the proof of Theorem 2 that concerns case
(A). We begin by proving a lemma.
Lemma 1. If (σ1, σ2) ∈ DE (θ1, θ2) then there exist actions a1, a′1 ∈ C (σ1) and a2, a′2 ∈ C (σ2) such that:
(a1, a2) ∈ DE (θ1, θ2), and (a′1, a′2) ∈ DE (θ1, θ2), with pi (a1, a2) ≥ pi (σ1, σ2), and pi (a′1, a′2) ≤ pi (σ1, σ2).
Proof. Note that for any mixed deception equilibrium (σ1, σ2) and any action a ∈ C (σ2), the profile (σ1, a)
is also a deception equilibrium (because otherwise the deceiver would not induce the deceived party to take a
mixed action that puts positive weight on a). It follows that there are actions a2, a′2 ∈ C (σ2) such that (σ1, a2)
and (σ1, a′2) are deception equilibria, with pi (σ1, a2) ≥ pi (σ1, σ2) and pi (σ1, a′2) ≤ pi (σ1, σ2). Furthermore, if
(σ1, a2) and (σ1, a′2) are deception equilibria, then for any action a ∈ C (σ1), the profiles (a, a2) and (a, a′2)
are also deception equilibria, with pi (σ1, a2) = pi (a, a2) and pi (σ1, a′2) = pi (a, a′2). Hence there are actions
a1, a
′
1 ∈ C (σ1) such that (a1, a2) and (a′1, a′2) are deception equilibria, with pi (a1, a2) = pi (σ1, a2) ≥ pi (σ1, σ2),
and pi (a1, a′2) = pi (σ1, a′2) ≤ pi (σ1, σ2).
Assume that case (A) holds: there is an incumbent θ˚ that plays inefficiently against itself, i.e.,
(
bθ˚
(
θ˚
)
, bθ˚
(
θ˚
))
6= (a¯, a¯), and there is no incumbent type with strictly higher cognitive level than θ˚ that satisfies any of the cases
(A), (B), or (C). To prove that this cannot hold in an NSC we introduce a mutant θˆ =
(
uˆ, nθ˚
)
/∈ C (µ∗) . If
Σ
(
uθ˚
)
= ∆, then we let uˆ ∈ UGI be such that θˆ =
(
uˆ, nθ˚
)
/∈ C (µ∗). If Σ (uθ˚) 6= ∆, then we fix a dominated
action a ∈ A\Σ (uθ˚), and let uˆ be defined as follows:
uˆ (a, a′) =

maxa∈A
(
uθ˚ (a, a¯)
)
a = a′ = a¯
uθ˚ (a, a′)− βa′ a = a and a′ 6= a¯
uθ˚ (a, a′) otherwise,
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where each βa′ ≥ 0 is chosen such that θˆ =
(
uˆ, nθ˚
)
/∈ C (µ∗). That is, if Σ (uθ˚) 6= ∆, then the utility function uˆ
is constructed from the utility function uθ˚ by arbitrarily lowering the payoff of some of the outcomes associated
with the (already) dominated action a and which do not involve action a¯, while increasing the payoff of the
outcome (a¯, a¯) by the minimal amount that makes a¯ a best reply to itself. Note that this definition of uˆ is valid
also for the case of a¯ = a. It follows that a ∈ Σ (uθ˚) ∪ {a¯} iff a ∈ Σ (uˆ). To see this, note that if Σ (uθ˚) 6= ∆
and a = a¯, then Σ (uˆ) = Σ
(
uθ˚
) ∪ {a¯}. Otherwise Σ (uˆ) = Σ (uθ˚). Thus, θˆ can be induced to play exactly the
same pure actions as θ˚, unless a¯ = a, in which case θˆ can be induced to play a¯ in addition to all actions that θ˚
can be induced to play.
Let µ′ be the distribution that assigns mass one to type
(
nθ˚, uˆ
)
. Let the post-entry type distribution be
µ˜ = (1− ) · µ+  · µ′, and let the post-entry behaviour policy b˜ be defined as follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality: b˜θ (θ′) = bθ (θ′) for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
2. In matches between the mutant type θˆ and any lower type θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) (with nθ′ < nθˆ), we distinguish
two cases.
(a) Suppose that Σ
(
uθ˚
)
= ∆. In this case let
(
b˜θˆ (θ′) , b˜θ′
(
θˆ
))
∈ FMDE
(
θˆ, θ′
)
. Note that FMDE
(
θˆ, θ′
)
is nonempty since in this case uˆ ∈ UGI .
(b) Suppose that Σ
(
uθ˚
) 6= ∆. In this case let (b˜θˆ (θ′) , b˜θ′ (θˆ)) = (a1, a2), for some (a1, a2) ∈ DE (θ˚, θ′)
such that pi (a1, a2) ≥ pi
(
bθ˚ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ˚
))
. By Lemma 1 above such a profile (a1, a2) exists.
3. In matches between the mutant type θˆ and any incumbent type θ′ with same level, the mutant θˆ mimics
θ˚, and the incumbent θ′ treats the mutant θˆ like the incumbent θ˚:
(
b˜θˆ (θ′) , b˜θ′
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bθ˚ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ˚
))
for all θ′ such that nθ′ = nθ˚ and θ′ 6= θˆ.
4. The mutant plays efficiently when meeting itself: b˜θˆ
(
θˆ
)
= a¯.
5. In matches between the mutant type θˆ and a higher type θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) (with nθ′ > nθˆ), we distinguish
two cases. Pick a profile (a1, a2) ∈ DE
(
θ′, θ˚
)
, such that pi (a2, a1) ≥ pi
(
bθ˚ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ˚
))
. By Lemma
1 above such a profile (a1, a2) exists. Moreover, by the construction of uˆ, it is either the case that
(a1, a2) ∈ DE
(
θ′, θˆ
)
, or there is some a˜ such that uθ′ (a˜, a¯) > uθ′ (a1, a2). In the latter case we have
(a¯, a¯) ∈ DE
(
θ′, θˆ
)
, due to the fact that (bθ′ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ′)) = (a¯, a¯) implies that a¯ is a best reply to a¯ for
type θ′.
(a) If uθ′ (a1, a2) > uθ′ (a¯, a¯) let
(
b˜θ′
(
θˆ
)
, b˜θˆ (θ′)
)
= (a1, a2). Note that by definition of (a1, a2) it holds
that pi (a2, a1) ≥ pi
(
bθ˚ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ˚
))
.
i. If uθ′ (a1, a2) ≤ uθ′ (a¯, a¯) let
(
b˜θ′
(
θˆ
)
, b˜θˆ (θ′)
)
= (a¯, a¯). Note that by definition of θ˚ it holds that
pi (a¯, a¯) ≥ pi
(
bθ˚ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ˚
))
.
By point 1,
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ, b)). By point 2 the mutant θˆ earns weakly more
than θ˚ against lower types. By point 3 the mutant θˆ earns the same as θ˚ against all incumbents of level nθ˚. By
points 3 and 4 (and the assumption that θ˚ does not play efficiently against itself), the mutant θˆ earns strictly
more than θ˚ against θˆ. By point 5 the mutant θˆ earns weakly more than θ˚ against all incumbents of a higher
cognitive level. In total the average fitness earned by θˆ is strictly higher than that of θ˚, against a population
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that follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. This implies that µ′ is a strictly better reply against µ∗ in the population game Γ(µ˜,b˜).
Thus, µ∗ is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and therefore it is not an NSS of Γ(µ˜,b˜), which implies that µ
∗
is not an NSC. Thus we have shown that θ˚ plays efficiently against itself.
B Variant with Uniform Deception
In this section we describe how to adapt our model in a way that requires players to use the same mixed
action in their deception efforts towards all opponents with lower cognitive levels. We implement this change
by replacing the definition of configuration with a new notion of configuration with uniform deception.
Definition 18. A configuration with uniform deception is a pair (µ, b) where µ ∈ ∆ (U) is a type distribution,
and b : C (µ)× C (µ) −→ ∆ (A) is a behavioural policy such that
1. For each type θ ∈ C (µ) , there exists σ˜ (θ) that satisfies
σ˜ (θ) ∈ arg max
σ∈∆(A)
 ∑
θ′∈C(µ), nθ′<nθ
µ (θ′) · max
σ′∈BRu(σ)
uθ (σ, σ′)
 , and
2. For each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ): bθ (θ′) = σ˜ (θ) and
nθ = nθ′ =⇒ (bθ (θ′) , b′θ (θ)) ∈ NE (θ, θ′) , and
nθ > nθ′ =⇒ bθ′ (θ) ∈ BRuθ′ (σ˜ (θ)) .
We interpret σ˜ (θ) as the strategy that lower levels are deceived into believing is being played by type θ, and
we interpret bθ (θ′) as the strategy of type θ when being matched with type θ′.
We restrict our definition of a neutrally stable configuration to a configuration with uniform deceptions:
Definition 19. A configuration (µ, b) is a neutrally stable configuration (NSC) with uniform deception, if for
every µ′ ∈ ∆ (Θ), there is some ε¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that if (µ˜, b˜), where µ˜ = (1− ε) ·µ+ε ·µ′, is a focal configuration
with uniform deceptions, then µ is an NSS in the type game Γ(µ˜,b˜).
An analogous change can be made to the setup of interdependent preferences. All other details of the model
are unchanged. It is relatively straightforward to see that all our results hold also in this setup of uniform
deceptions, with minor adaptations to the proofs.
C Constructions of Heterogeneous NSCs in Examples
The first subsection presents a lemma on stable heterogeneous populations, which will later be used to construct
NSCs in the Rock-Paper-Scissors and Hawk-Dove games, with type-neutral and type-interdependent preferences.
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C.1 A Useful Lemma on Stable Heterogeneous Populations
Consider a configuration (µ, b), consisting of a type distribution with (finite) support C (µ) ⊆ {(u, n)}∞n=1, and
behaviour policies such that
pi (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) =

t if nθ > nθ′
w if nθ = nθ′
s if nθ < nθ′
. (3)
Thus t is the payoff that a player of type θ earns when deceiving an opponent of type θ′, and s is the payoff
earned by the deceived party. When two individuals of the same type meet they earn w. Our first lemma
concerns the type game Γ(µ,b) that is induced by a configuration (µ, b), such that C (µ) ⊆ {(u, n)}∞n=1 and with
behaviour policies given by (3). Although we have normalized k1 = 0 in the main text, we do not omit reference
to k1 in what follows. This is done to simplify the proofs.
Lemma 2. Suppose t ≥ w ≥ s. Suppose that there is an N such that
kN − k1 ≤ t− s < kN+1 − k1, (4)
and suppose that
t− w > kn+1 − kn for all n ≤ N . (5)
Consider the type game Γ(µ,b) induced by a configuration (µ, b) with a type distribution such that C (µ) ⊆
{(u, n)}∞n=1, and with behaviour policies given by (3).
1. If 2w < s+ t then Γ(µ,b) has a unique ESS µ∗ ∈ ∆ (C (µ)), which is mixed, i.e., C (µ∗) > 1, and in which
no type above N is present, i.e., C (µ∗) ⊆ {(u, n)}Nn=1.
2. If 2w = s + t then Γ(µ,b) has an NSS µ∗ ∈ ∆ (C (µ)), which is mixed, i.e., C (µ∗) > 1, and in which no
type above N is present, i.e., C (µ∗) ⊆ {(u, n)}Nn=1.
3. If 2w > s+ t then Γ(µ,b), admits no NSS and hence no ESS.
The rest of this subsection is devoted to proving this result.
First note that type (u,N + 1) earns strictly less than (u, 1) at all population states, and (u,N) earns
at least as much as (u, 1) at least at some population state. This immediately follows from s ≤ w ≤ t and
t − kN+1 < s − k1 and s − k1 ≤ t − kN . For this reason it is sufficient to consider the type distributions with
support in {(u, n)}Nn=1. The payoffs for a type game with all these types present are
(u, 1) (u, 2) (u, 3) . . . (u,N − 1) (u,N)
(u, 1) w − k1 s− k1 s− k1 . . . s− k1 s− k1
(u, 2) t− k2 w − k2 s− k2 . . . s− k2 s− k2
(u, 3) t− k3 t− k3 w − k3 . . . s− k3 s− k3
...
...
...
... . . .
...
...
(u,N − 1) t− kN−1 t− kN−1 t− kN−1 . . . w − kN−1 s− kN−1
(u,N) t− kN t− kN t− kN . . . t− kN w − kN
,
29
or in matrix form
A =

w − k1 s− k1 s− k1 . . . s− k1 s− k1
t− k2 w − k2 s− k2 . . . s− k2 s− k2
t− k3 t− k3 w − k3 . . . s− k3 s− k3
...
...
... . . .
...
...
t− kN−1 t− kN−1 t− kN−1 . . . w − kN−1 s− kN−1
t− kN t− kN t− kN . . . t− kN w − kN

.
Inspecting the matrix A we make the following observation:
Claim 1. Consider the game with payoff matrix A. Suppose (5) holds.
1. (u, n+ 1) is the unique best response to n for all n ∈ {1, .., N − 2}.
(a) If t− kN > s− k1 then (u,N) is the unique best reply to (u,N − 1).
(b) If t− kN = s− k1 then (u,N) and (u, 1) are the only two best replies to (u,N − 1).
(c) (u, 1) is the unique best response to (u,N).
Proof. Condition (5) implies that t− kN+1 > w− kN , and the definition of N implies t− kN+1 < s− k1. Taken
together this implies that w − kN < s− k1, which means that (u, 1) is the unique best response to (u,N).
The definition of N entails t − kN ≥ s − k1. If t − kN > s − k1 then (u,N) is the unique best reply to
(u,N − 1). If t− kN = s− k1 then (u,N) and (u, 1) are the only two best replies to (u,N − 1). Furthermore,
(5) implies that (u, n+ 1) is the unique best response to (u, n) for all n ∈ {1, .., N − 2}.
It is an immediate consequence of the above lemma that all Nash equilibria of A are mixed, i.e., that they
have more than one type in their support. Next, we examine the stability properties of such equilibria. As
discussed in the proof of Theorem 2, it is well-known that if A is negative definite (semi-definite) with respect
to the tangent space; i.e., if v ·Av < 0 for all v ∈ Rd0 = {v ∈ Rd :
∑d
i=1 vi = 0}, v 6= 0, then A admits a unique
ESS (but not necessarily a unique NSS). Moreover, the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of NSS and
constitutes a nonempty convex subset of the simplex (Hofbauer and Sandholm 2009, Theorem 3.2).
One can show:
Claim 2. If 2w ≥ (≤) s+ t then A is positive (negative) semi-definite w.r.t. the tangent space.
Proof. Let
K =

−k1 −k1 . . . −k1
−k2 −k2 . . . −k2
...
... . . .
...
−kN −kN . . . −kN
 , B =

w s . . . s
t w . . . s
...
... . . .
...
t t . . . w
 ,
so that
A = B + K.
Note that v′Kv = 0 for all v ∈ RN0 , v 6= 0, so that v′Av < 0 for all v ∈ RN0 , v 6= 0, if and only if v′Bv < 0 for
all v ∈ RN0 , v 6= 0. Moreover, note that v′Bv < 0 for all v ∈ RN0 , v 6= 0, if and only if v′B¯v < 0 for all v ∈ RN0 ,
v 6= 0, where
B¯ = 12
(
B + BT
)
.
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One can transform the problem to one of checking negative definiteness with respect to RN−1 rather than the
tangent space RN0 ; see, e.g.,Weissing (1991). This is done with the N × (N − 1) matrix P defined by
pij =

1 if n = jand n, j < N
0 if n 6= jand n, j < N
−1 if n = N
.
We have
P′B¯P =
(
w − 12 (s+ t)
)
(I + 11′) ,
where 1 is an N − 1-dimensional vector with all entries equal to 1, and I is the identity matrix. The matrix
P′B¯P has one eigenvalue (of multiplicity N − 1) that is equal to 2w− (s+ t). Finally, note that this eigenvalue
is non-negative if and only if 2w ≥ (s+ t).
It follows that if 2w ≤ s + t then the game with payoff matrix A admits an NSS. If 2w > s + t then the
game does not have a mixed NSS. We are now able to prove Lemma 2.
1. If 2w < s + t then by Lemma 2 A is negative definite w.r.t. the tangent space, implying that it has a
unique ESS. Lemma 1 implies that there can be no pure Nash equilibria (and hence no pure ESS). Thus
A has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is mixed. As observed earlier, type (u,N + 1) (and higher types)
earn strictly less than (θ, 1) for all population states, which implies that this unique equilibrium remains
an ESS also when they are included in the set of feasible types.
2. If 2w = s + t then A is both positive and negative semi-definite w.r.t. the tangent space. In this case
A does not have an ESS but it does have a set of NSSs, all of which are Nash equilibria. Moreover, we
know that A has no pure NE, and so all NSS are mixed. Again, type (u,N + 1) (and higher types) can
be ignored because they always earn strictly less than (θ, 1).
3. If 2w < s+ t then A is positive definite w.r.t. the tangent space, implying that it has no NSC.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 4: Equilibrium in Rock-Paper-Scissors Game
Formally the behaviour of the incumbent types is as follows:
b∗θ (θ′) =

(0, 1, 0) if nθ > nθ′( 1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
if nθ = nθ′
(1, 0, 0) if nθ < nθ′
.
Under the described behavioural policy we have
pi (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) =

1 if nθ > nθ′
0 if nθ = nθ′
−1 if nθ < nθ′
.
Start by restricting attention to the set of types {(upi, n)}∞n=1. That is, for the moment we use {(upi, n)}∞n=1
instead of Θ as the set of all types. All definitions can be amended accordingly. Lemma 2 in Appendix B implies
that there is an NSC (µ∗, b∗), such that C (µ∗) ⊆ {(upi, n)}Nn=1, and µ∗ is mixed. Lemma 2 establishes that
the type game between the types {(upi, n)}Nn=1 behaves much like an N -player version of a Hawk-Dove game:
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it has a unique symmetric equilibrium that is in mixed strategies and that is neutrally or evolutionarily stable,
depending on whether the payoff matrix of the type game is negative semi-definite, or negative definite, with
respect to the tangent space.
It remains to show that types not in {(upi, n)}∞n=1 are unable to invade. Suppose a mutant of type (u′, n′)
enters. Incumbents of level n > n′ will give the mutant a belief that induces the mutant to play some action a′
and then play action a′ + 1mod 3, which is the incumbents’ best response to a′. Thus, against incumbents of
level n > n′ the mutant earns −1. Against incumbents of level n < n′, the mutant will earn at most 1. Against
incumbents of level n′ the mutant earns at most 0. Against itself the mutant (or a group of mutants for that
matter) will earn 0. Thus any mutant of level n′ earns weakly less than the incumbents of level n′, in any focal
post-entry configuration.
Remark 5. Our analysis is similar to that of Conlisk (2001). Like us, he works with a hierarchy of cognitive
types (though in his case it is fixed and finite), where higher cognitive types carry higher cognitive costs. He
stipulates that when a high type meets a low type the high type gets 1 and the low type gets −1. If two
equals meet both get 0. He shows that there is a neutrally stable equilibrium of this game between types (using
somewhat different arguments than we do), and explores comparative static effects of changing costs. However,
unlike in our model, in Conlisk’s model all individuals have the same materialistic preferences and the payoffs
earned from deception are not derived from an underlying game.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 10: Equilibrium in Hawk-Dove with Type-Interdependent
Preferences
Formally, the behaviour of an incumbent θ ∈ C (µ∗) facing another incumbent θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) is given by
b∗θ (θ′) =
{
D if nθ ≥ nθ′
H if nθ < nθ′
. (6)
Under the described behavioural policy we have, for θ, θ′ ∈ {(un, n)}∞n=1,
pi (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) =

1 + g if nθ > nθ′
1 if nθ = nθ′
1− l if nθ < nθ′
.
Start by restricting attention to the set of types {(un, n)}∞n=1. That is, for the moment, let {(un, n)}∞n=1, instead
of ΘID, be the set of all types. All definitions can be amended accordingly. Under this restriction on the set
of types, the desired results (i)–(iii) follow from Lemma 2 in Appendix B. For example, to see that Lemma 2
implies part (i) for the restricted type set, note that g > l implies that 2w < t+ s, and g > kn+1 − kn implies
that t− w > kn+1 − kn, in the language of Lemma 2. The arguments for (ii) and (iii) are analogous.
Next, allow for a larger set of types ΘID, such that {(un, n)}∞n=1 ⊆ ΘID. The fact that part (iii) of
Proposition 10 holds for the restricted set of types implies that it also holds for any larger set of types. It
remains to prove parts (i) and (ii) for the full set of types. We prove only part (i). The proof of part (ii) is very
similar.
Consider a population consisting exclusively of types from the set {(un, n)}∞n=1, and assume that the type
distribution of these incumbents, together with the behaviour policy (6), would have constituted an ESC if the
type set had been restricted to {(un, n)}∞n=1. Suppose a mutant of type (u′, n′) /∈ {(un, n)}∞n=1 enters. If it
is the case that type
(
un
′
, n′
)
is not among the incumbents, then by the definition of an ESC, it must earn
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weakly less against the incumbents than what the incumbents earn against each other. Thus it is sufficient to
show that the mutant of type (u′, n′) earns less than what a mutant or incumbent of the same cognitive level,
i.e., type
(
un
′
, n′
)
, would earn.
Against an incumbent (un, n) of level n > n′ a mutant of type (u′, n′) earns at most 1− l, and type
(
un
′
, n′
)
earns 1− l. Against an incumbent (un, n) of level n = n′ a mutant of type (u′, n′) earns at most 1− l, and type(
un
′
, n′
)
earns 1. Against incumbents (un, n) of level n < n′ a mutant of type (u′, n′) earns at most 1 + g, and
type
(
un
′
, n′
)
earns 1 + g. Thus in all cases, a mutant (u′, n′) /∈ {(un, n)}∞n=1 earns strictly less than what a
mutant or incumbent of type
(
un
′
, n′
)
earns. Hence if mutants are sufficiently rare they will earn strictly less
than incumbents in any focal post-entry configuration.
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